VI. Women and Work 2000-2005

In this section I will first discuss change in economic policy globally since the 1960s and its impact on Iran. This is important to show that contrary to the popular perception in the West which portrays Iran as ‘Islamic Fundamentalist’, Iran has embraced neo-liberal economic policy since the mid 1990s. From 2000 to 2005, the government and parliament has accommodated both privatisation and NGOisation. Secondly, although Iran’s economic policy has changed according to global economic policy, the Iranian state as a rentier state and interventionist state has made good progress in terms of economic development and Human Development.

Therefore in this section I will demonstrate this by comparing statistics on health, education and employment between the 1960s and 2005. Finally, the discussion of women’s work during 2000–2005 will focus on both the informal and formal sectors of the economy, but with a particular emphasis on women’s work in private enterprises, self employment and NGOs. My emphasis will be on how women provide millions of hours of formal and informal work, some paid, some unpaid and voluntary work. Some of this work can be defined as production, such as job creation through income generating activities. Others are provision of resources, networking and advocacy. Reliable statistics do not exist, but accounting for these tasks is important as they increase the number of women who are engaged in production, poverty alleviation and survival strategies. These tasks are also good measures to assess their empowerment outcome. In this section I will also discuss the role of women’s NGOs as civil society organisations. I will argue that these women’s NGOs are the extension of the women’s movement of the 1990s; they are challenging institutional power and have achieved substantive goals; they act as an autonomous space between state and market, and hence are able to empower some sections of marginalised women.

Change in economic policy globally and in Iran

The last four decades have witnessed massive changes in global development policy. In the 1960s and 1970s states were seen as the key actors. By the 1980s, with the collapse of communism in the USSR and Eastern Europe, different factors criticised the effectiveness of the state in promoting economic and social developments. The ‘New Right’ emerged in the USA with its philosophy of neo-liberalism; also known as the ‘Washington Consensus’. The neo-liberal agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF called for the rolling back of the state and condemned virtually any form of state intervention. [1] This philosophy and policy matched with a rise in NGOs and the discourse of participation and empowerment became the new orthodoxy.

By the early 1990s the discourse of neo-liberalism and the emphasis on Structural Adjustment Programmes (deregulation to encourage privatisation, removing price control and cutting subsidies) was imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on African, Asian and Latin American countries. This policy deepened economic crises and worsened social conditions for a great majority of people.

Joseph Stiglitz, professor of economics at Columbia University, USA, who was the vice president and chief economist of the World Bank from 1997 to 2000, argued that the liberalisation of the capital markets had not generated growth. Therefore, the benefits of globalisation can only come about from more equitable mobility of manpower. [2] Similarly, Jeffrey Sachs, the professor of economics at Columbia University and special advisor to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, argued that in the 1990s even the tiger economies of East and South East Asia experienced economic crises, unemployment and poverty for millions of people. Therefore, he criticised the IMF for being a threat to global macroeconomic stability and prosperity. [3] Many feminist economists criticised the onslaught of neo-liberal policies, especially the impact of Structural Adjustment Programmes. They argued that many third world countries had witnessed a deterioration of living conditions for the majority of their population. [4]

As a result, in the 1990s, new development directions were discussed in terms of governance, civil society, sustainability, democratisation, accountability, efficiency and the market. The World Bank and the UNDP emphasised market growth development, but with a limited role for the state. [5] The World Bank's approach required the state to provide social development like health and education, and to provide a legal framework for the opening up and operation of the market, but not to intervene in the economic sphere. The UNDP's approach was for the state to address the issues of basic needs, Human Development (education, health, gender, ethnicity and other forms of equality and democracy). Both approaches were in favour of NGOs and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) as agents of development, rather than large state bureaucracies. [6]

In this period, the growing support for NGOs was seen in the context of New Policy Agenda, [7] a policy driven by the twin poles of neo-liberal economic and liberal democratic theory. In this agenda, NGOs have a double advantage. They are seen as the preferred channels for service provisions in deliberate substitute for the state, and act as vehicles for democratisation and essential components of a thriving civil society. [8] Therefore, in many developing countries NGOs are seen as the tool of international institutions such as the World Bank, United Nations and local governments.

Many authors also pointed out the limitations of NGOs. For example, Turner and Hulme [9] argued that NGOs must recognise their limitations and acknowledge the fact that, although they have certain comparative advantages, they cannot replace the state. NGOs should strengthen civil society to make it more effective and cohesive in articulating people’s needs to negotiate with the state apparatus, while demanding greater public accountability. NGOs have a major role to play in making sure that governments respond effectively to the needs of the poorer, deprived sectors of society which have been neglected in the policy-making processes. Increasingly the task of Human Development was assigned to NGOs. This was because NGOs were perceived as well suited to provide the services that states had to abandon in the process of Structural Adjustment Programmes. Also the NGOs were seen as setting limits to state abuse and inefficiency and provide a vehicle for more democratic participation through civil society. [10] However, feminist writers also argued that despite the inclusion of gender issues in NGO programmes, they did not necessarily serve the interest of the majority of women. [11]

It is important to realise that the centrality that NGOs have acquired in development agendas has been shaped not only by forces coming from bilateral (governmental) and multilateral (World Bank and IMF) development institutions, but also by pressure from grassroots movements resisting agendas promoted by the state and the market, which has human, social and environmental consequences. [12] Therefore, in some developing countries the rise of NGOs must also be seen as part of the women’s movement, as well as the youth, student, environmentalist and human rights movements and other pressure groups. In these countries, political restrictions do not allow independent organisations. Therefore, women, students and youths have grabbed the opportunity provided by the governments, the World Bank and the United Nations and have established their NGOs. Globally they have played important roles in anti-globalisation movements and locally they constitute an important component of democracy movements. [13]

The appointment of Paul Wolfowitz, known as the neo-conservative godfather of the Iraq invasion, as the president of the World Bank and the appointment of John Bolton, another hawk and unilateralist, as the US ambassador to the UN are alarming. This is because in the world of NGOs and liberal thinkers these appointments will run counter to development policy-making trends.

The impact of the global economy on Iran

Throughout 2000-2005 the Iranian government and the parliament accommodated both privatisation and NGOisation. As was discussed above, this process began in the 1990s. For example, in 1968, there were 377 NGOs in Iran. [14] By 1999, there were 4000 registered NGOs. [15] In 1976-1977, there were 13 women's NGOs in Iran, by 2001-2002 that number had risen to 137 and by 2004 it was 279 and many more that were not registered. [16] There were also a large number of women's cooperatives, mainly in rural areas, which were linked to women's NGOs. [17]

This demonstrates that the Iranian state responded positively to the New Policy Agenda and globalisation. However, as was discussed above, the Iranian state as a rentier state used oil money for economic development and as an interventionist state under the pressure of women, students and workers invested in public services. For example by 2003:

• Percentage of population using improved drinking water reached 93%.
• Percentage of population using adequate sanitation facilities reached 84%.
• 99% of children were immunised, financed by the government.
• HIV prevalence rate among adults (15-49) was 0.1% - lowest in the region.
• Percentage of population urbanised was 67%.
• Female life expectancy as a percentage of males was 104%.
• Contraceptive prevalence (1995-2003) was 74% - highest in the region.
• The number of seats in parliament held by women as percentage of total was 4.1%. In Turkey it was 4.4%.
• The number of female professional and technical workers as a percentage of total was 32.9%. In the Republic of Korea it was 33.7%. The percentage of female administrators and managers was 12.8%. In Cyprus it was 13.5%.
• Literacy rate increased to 94% for both sexes.
• 64% of university students were women.
• Life Expectancy for both sexes was 71.
• GDP per capital average annual growth rate was 2.4%.
• Under certain circumstances mandatory abortion was approved.
• Advisory viewpoints of female judicial advisors with the judicial status were sought by the head of the court before issuing the final ruling on divorce.
• Marriage contract for girls before the age of 14 and for boys before the age of 16 was subject to consent of the parents provided that the court recognised the expediency of the marriage.
• A process of enhancing the age of puberty of girls from 9 to 13 was underway.

Source: Iran statistical yearbook 2003; CWP 2003; UNDP 2004; UNICEF 2005. [18]

As was discussed above, there has also been a significant increase in the number of NGOs in Iran. This can also be attributed to change in economic policy globally and locally. However, as I will argue later in this section the activities of NGOs including women’s NGOs are limited and they cannot replace the state. But, in this limited role, some women's NGOs have provided opportunities for some women with voluntary and paid work. Equally important, as civil society organisations their actions have proven to be crucial for the promotion of social and institutional change.

Women’s achievements through the lens of statistics

Table 1: Literacy Rate 1966–2002 (%)

In 2002, the literacy rate increased to 94% for both sexes.
Source: Iran Statistical Yearbook 2001-2 and 2002-3. [19]

Table 2: Percentage of Male and Female Higher Education Students in Different Areas of Study (2002 – 2003)

Source: CWP 2003. [20]

In this period, the culture of education changed. Having a High School Diploma was no longer considered as proper education. Even families in rural areas sent their daughters to big and small towns and cities to have further and higher education. Now, in most towns and cities there are two or three branches of various universities. Yet, every year the demand for Further and Higher Education exceeds the supply. In order to have access to further and higher education, young women and men from big cities like Tehran commute to small cities or towns and young women and men from small cities, towns and villages commute to big urban centres such as Tehran. This has increased the level of class and cultural diversity everywhere. Higher Education is no longer for the middle and upper classes of urban centres.

In 2000-2003, the number of female students in higher education reached 64%. Still the numbers of male graduates in most subjects are higher than female graduates, but in a few years time this will be reversed at least in some areas of expertise and will further change the character of the labour force and the labour market.

Tables 3, 4 and 5 demonstrate significant improvements on health issues, while Table 6 demonstrates the increase in GDP per capita:

Table 3: Child Mortality Rate 1960 - 2003

Table 4: Life Expectancy 1970 - 2003

Table 5: The Rate of Population Growth 1970s - 2003

Sources: Iran Statistical Yearbook 1996-97: 33; UNICEF 2005: 127. [21]

Table 6: Increase in GDP per Capita 1960 - 2003

Source: Iran Statistical Year Book 2002-3; CWP 2003; UNICEF 2005; UNDP 2004. [22]

Tables 7 and 8 demonstrate the increase in the percentage of the female workforce.

Table 7: Female Workforce in Selected State Ministries, 1974 - 2002 (%)

Source: Extracted and calculated from Iran Statistical Yearbooks 1977/8: 66; 1986/7:86; 1996/7: 89; 2002/3: 88-127. [23]

Table 8: Increase in the Number of Large Industries Employing more than 10 Workers and % of Female Workforce in these Industries

Source: Extracted and calculated from Iran Statistical Yearbook 2002/3: 88-127. [24]

There were also hundreds of thousands of small scale industries employing less than 10 workers. They are divided into the following categories: employers, self-employed, private sector wage/salary employees and unpaid family workers. This sector can be categorised as the Iranian informal sector. [25]

However, besides these two officially recognised formal and informal sectors, large numbers of women and men contribute to the economy in a variety of fields in urban and rural areas. As will be discussed, thousands of workers work in NGOs but are invisible in the statistics.

It is important to note that every year approximately 1,000,000 educated and potentially skilled workers become job seekers. But the economy can absorb only one third of them per year. [26] NGOs provide some paid, unpaid and voluntary work which is important, but like NGOs in other parts of the world, they cannot replace the state either in job creation or the provision of basic care.

Therefore, in my view the interventionist policies are important in Iran. The continued economic development and improved Human Development Indicators correspond with the increasingly high expectations of a young population. Like in many other developing countries, with the demise of the interventionist state unemployment will rise, social services will decline and the standard of living will fall for a significant percentage of people and could easily lead to civil discontent.

In recent years, a strong women’s movement has continued to press for reform of law regarding the economic, social and political life of women. The reforms in this period include equality between men and women’s basic pay. [27] As is demonstrated in table 9, although women’s income lags behind men’s, the gap is narrowing down and the percentage increase is high.

Table 9: Share of Female Income in Comparison with Male Income

Source: CWP 2003. [28]

For a long time, women journalists campaigned for this equality within their associations. Sedaye Zan (Women’s Voice), the publication of the Women Journalist’s Trade Association discussed gender wage differentiation amongst the media workers, women's long hours of work, their absence at management level and the impact of the closure of the media in 2000-2002 on women's employment. [29]

Women also won their demand to have equal access to the workers’ loan. [30] In contrast to the 1990s, female headed households are officially recognised. The formal sector of the economy implements the law and women receive all entitlements equal to men. But most informal sector enterprises still do not respect the law.

Nahid Ashrafi, director of the Hami Non-Governmental Organisation also explained that: ‘In most state institutions such as the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Employment) and so on there is a section called Moshavere Omore Zanan (Women’s Issues Consultancy), not just in the headquarters, but also in branches all over the country, even in small towns. This means that a large number of young educated women are in a position of consultancy or management, even in small towns, to promote women’s issues. There are also a few women in the position of Mayor and governorship of towns and cities’.

As was discussed previously, in the 1990s job security made the state sector of the economy more attractive to both men and women seeking jobs than the small private sector. In 2000–2005 the level of wages in state enterprises and large industries increased. As is shown in tables 7 and 8, the increase in the percentage of women in these sectors reflects that although the rate of female employment in these sectors is still less than men, the gap is narrowing down. The job market is increasingly competitive, as every year larger numbers of educated women and men leave universities and enter the job market. The notion of ‘women’s jobs’ and ‘men’s jobs’ is gradually withering away. In some cases, employers prefer women workers because they remain in one place and work harder. Men tend to look for ‘a better job’ all the time. Elham, 30, with a degree in Economics explained: ‘After I finished my degree, I was looking for a job at a Bank or in the Education system. But I did not succeed as the job market in these institutions is very competitive. I worked in a number of small private enterprises as an accountant, but I did not find this challenging. Finally I got a job in the food industry, a large institution, as an industrial accountant. I was able to compete with male candidates and find my place in the workforce.’

Women’s access to education and employment has meant that the average age of marriage is now 24. Young women commute from one city or town to another. Elham explained: ‘I got married when I was 30, until then I lived with my parents. They had no objection to my work. My mother was worried about me commuting from Tehran to Karaj every day, leaving home early in the morning and returning home late in the evening. But in the last few years it has become normal to see young women commuting on the busses until 9-10 in the evening. It is now normal for women not to get married until they are in their mid or late 20s or even early 30s. In my workplace there are at least 20 educated women in their late 20s or early 30s who are not married’.

Even in small cities young women work and get married later and later. Kolsom Bazi, a 24 year old artist, lives and works in Zahedan, a small city in the south east of Iran. She runs a bookshop, a library and a Friday book market to encourage young people to read. She also works full time for Kanone Parvareshe Fekri Kodakan va Nojavanan (The Centre for Intellectual Development of Children and Young People). She is not married and has devoted her life to her work. She regularly travels to Asian countries with her friends. Her family has no objection to her work and way of life. She is not under pressure to get married. ‘For the time being, my life is fulfilled. I feel that I have achieved a great deal by studying, working and travelling’.

As was discussed in section four, between 1990 and 2003 the annual growth rate of GDP increased by 2.4%. This high rate of growth resulted in high inflation – an annual rate of increase of 24% in this period. This means that the majority of women and men who get married have to work; one wage is not enough to cope with inflation. It is no longer possible for parents to accommodate their sons or daughters living with them, unless they are very rich. This has led to an increase in the number of nuclear families and the breakdown of traditional families with 3 generations living under one roof.

As will be discussed, the culture of work has also changed within small private enterprises and young women are now confident to work in them or to be self-employed, especially within the informal sector.

Women’s work in the private sector

Coffee shops

Throughout 2003-2004 the number of coffee shops in Iran increased, employing young female university graduates. Many young women and men use coffee shops to meet socially or to discuss social and political issues and a large number of young women work in them. Many have argued that it is good to have women working in these places because the presence of a female waitress makes it easier for young women to sit in a coffee shop without being harassed by men. Also the character of coffee shops is changing from the traditional ghahvekhaneh (coffee house), which was and still is a totally male institution where men are served by men.

Rezvaneh had a degree in Industrial Design. She worked as a waitress in one of Tehran’s coffee shops. She argued that, ten years ago in the mid 1990s, her family did not allow her to work in a coffee shop or a restaurant. But now, they are happy because for years she tried hard to prove to them that her independent identity is a positive characteristic for a young woman like her. [31]

Although the culture of work has changed for a great majority of the population, the patriarchal institutions continue to create obstacles for young women working in the informal sector. For example, in March 2004, Edareh Amaken, a part of the Ministry of Keshwar (Interior), ordered coffee shops to stop employing female waitresses. Zanan Magazine, a widely read woman’s journal challenged the action for acting against the constitution and for practicing gender based discrimination against women. The journal argued that according to article 28 of the constitution, any person has the right to choose a job which is not against the well being of the public and the right of other individuals. Also, according to the same law, the government has the duty to provide employment opportunities for its citizens. [32]

The culture of work within another male dominated profession is also changing. A large number of women are engaged in the property market. Although the majority of those who are engaged in this profession are still men, more and more young educated women are entering it. It is a profitable business and there is no gender boundary. Zari, a 50 year old businesswoman explained: ‘My income from this profession is much more than my husband’s salary and he is a pilot who works for a private company. He welcomes my engagement in this profession. It is good for both of us and for our children. He is a religious man and believes that my money belongs to me and he does not allow himself to tell me what to do with my money. For me, the money that I earn belongs to all of us in the family. I do not see myself separate from my husband and my children’.

Women’s NGOs in Iran

In Iran, like many other developing countries, some women's NGOs provide paid, unpaid and voluntary work for women. A wide range of NGOs’ activities take place in local neighbourhoods and communities. Some of these activities can easily be defined as production. Others are not directly linked to the market. However as was discussed in chapter one, it is important to recognise the millions of hours of work created by the voluntary sector and their monetary equivalent, which could reach millions of dollars. [33]

In Iran, some NGOs are registered. Therefore, I would argue that because the millions of hours of work and the monetary value that they create are significant, they can be categorised as part of the formal sector of the economy. There are also many other NGOs which are waiting to be registered. In the process of registration, which may take many months, they are creating millions of invisible hours of work. To recognise their contribution they can be categorised as part of the informal sector of the economy. As was discussed in chapter one, it is important to recognise that there are different forms of the informal sector, ranging from home working to paid and unpaid work in different institutions including the voluntary sector. Some are linked directly or indirectly to industrial and service work in more formal settings. These are profit-oriented operations and can include self-employment and wage work. Others represent survival activities organised at the household and community level. [34]

As will be discussed, women's NGOs in Iran are an extension of the women's movement of the 1990s. If civil society is conceptualised as an autonomous space between state and market, [35] this case study of Iran demonstrates that women's NGOs provide opportunities for fundamental social change as well as new sources of identity for individuals and groups. [36] However the creation of autonomous spheres of social activity for women has been undermined by a patriarchal social order and the multiple sites - the intertwining of civil society, state, religion, and family - through which social gender is constructed. [37] Nevertheless, women's NGOs in Iran have been challenging institutional power, especially gender-specific access and influence, and have achieved substantive goals. They are recognised as a social group that shares common interests and legitimate claims on society.

This analysis is based on twenty five interviews which took place in Tehran, Iran throughout 2000-2004. My interviewees were leading members of women's NGOs; participants of the Hable Rood Project, involving GOs, NGOs and the UNDP and specialists on Women's NGOs and networking. [38]

Historical background

In Iran, the origin of NGOs goes back to charity organisations which have existed for centuries. [39] These are traditional CBOs which are considered as genuinely grass root organisations, where people have come together to resolve local issues. They are totally independent of the state and international institutions and totally rely on the community for their funding and their activities.

According to Ehteram Malakoti Nejad, a leading member of Gorouhe Banovane Nikokar Asayeshgahe Malolin Va Salmandane Kahrizak (Ladies Charitable Society, Kahrizak), ‘The oldest charities are religious Hayaats. This institution organises the local community throughout the year to prepare for the month of Moharam, an important Muslim Shiat remembrance month. Throughout the year, volunteers, mainly women from within the local community are engaged in charity work. As a result, a large amount of money is collected for the poor, because there is a belief that if they help the poor their best wishes may come true’.

Beside these traditional NGOs, in the 1990s a large number of 'Modern NGOs' were established. They are defined as being independent of the state and other institutions, as well as being non-profitable and voluntary organisations. In some projects these NGOs collaborate with GOs and international organisations. Most of my interviewees argued that they are community based, because they work with particular sections of society, for example, those who provide opportunities for women to have access to employment, self-employment and income generation activities in tribal, rural and urban areas, or those who provide resources and care for the elderly, the physically or mentally disabled, street children and drug addicts.

Some of these NGOs are committed to a bottom up approach, the idea that the leadership should be elected by ordinary members and they cannot be re-elected more than twice for this position. According to Shirin Ebadi, the winner of the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize and a leading member of Anjomane Hemayat Az Hoghoghe Kodakan (The Society For the Protection of the Rights of Children), ‘This approach will ensure the democratic nature of these organisations’.

Many women’s NGOs are critical of the state for a number of reasons: a political space for the self-development of these NGOs does not exist; the state has no programmes in support of community-based efforts; the state does not provide an administrative framework in support of these NGOs; they feel that their efforts are ignored by the state.

There are also other problems: To set up and register an NGO in Iran requires passing through a lot of red tape and bureaucratic institutions, which may take several years. There is a fear that these NGOs may be politically motivated and challenge the state monopoly of power. Since the late 1990s, a number of state ministries (Ministry of Education, Health, Plan and Budget Organisation, Agriculture, Reconstruction Crusade, Co-operatives and others) have been involved with the NGOs. This co-operation and the pressure from below have made it easier for NGOs to operate. They are having an impact both on the people who benefit from their services and on the state. In the eyes of many people they are doing something important which is the responsibility of the state.

In order to remove some of the legal obstacles many women's NGOs have taken the initiative to press for reforms of the state and other institutions. Marzieh Seddighi, a leading member of Taavoni Sara (Sara Cooperatives) and Kanoone Zanane Karafarin (Women’s Work Creation Centre) explained: ‘Women were not involved in the old bureaucracy. More importantly, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, they worked systematically on women's issues. It was the strength of women's organisations and women pressing for reforms which made many reforms possible. Therefore, we could have an impact on the state and policy formation’.

Funding issues

In the Iranian context, there are two Islamic institutions which have traditionally been the main source of funds for charity purposes: Vaghf and Gharzolhasaneh. Vaghf means that wealthy individuals devote their property or money to be at the disposal of those who need financial help. For example, one may vaghf their property to be turned into a Refuge for women who escape domestic violence. The Vaghef (the person who has devoted her/his wealth) has a representative, Motevali, who after the death of the Vaghef will carry out his/her wishes.

Gharzolhassaneh is an interest free small loan. It could be in the form of a charity fund or a bank loan. There are no legal barriers to stop women having access to these funds, but traditionally they are controlled by men, so women actually have very little access to them. In the form of a charity fund, they may be used for repair work on the house, or to help a young couple get married. In the form of a bank loan they could be considered as a form of micro-credit, specified for the purpose of income generating activities, enabling women to have access to self-employment or employment.

Many women NGO activists argued that gharzolhassaneh, as a charity fund, is not a satisfactory system for women because there are too many traditional barriers. Instead they were trying to make the bank loans accessible to women, taking into account women's reproductive responsibilities and the cultural pressure on them.

For example, Fatemeh Shabani, a leading member of Zanane Karfarma (Female Enterprise), argued that: ‘Banks must provide opportunities for women to have access to micro-credit for the purpose of employment or self employment. But more than one loan. Our experience has shown that women usually need three loans in a period of ten years in order to establish a viable business. Also women should be in charge of giving loans to women, because only women understand the relationship between the reproductive and productive role of women within the household. For example, a woman who receives a loan may be forced to use the money to take her sick child to the doctor, or to repair the roof to keep the house warm for her family members. Also in some cases the male kin may force a woman to pass the money on to them. So if women are in charge of giving loans to women they can take these issues into consideration and make sure that the woman is not under financial or cultural pressures’.

The creation of Taavoonihaye Zanan (Women's Cooperatives) by women is another source of provision of funds for women to have access to employment or self-employment. For example, they buy sewing machines and knitting machines. These machines provide income generating activities for poorer women. Some of these cooperatives receive interest free loans from the government.

The majority of my interviewees were not in favour of receiving funds from the state and other national and international institutions. They believed that the NGOs’ financial dependence may be contradictory to their aims and objectives. They totally relied on their members, supporters and the voluntary work of specialists such as doctors, nurses, psychologists, physiotherapists and councillors. They also organised fundraising exhibitions, concerts and markets.

Some women activists believed in gender consciousness raised through participatory approaches. According to Noushin Ahmadi Khorasani, a leading member of the Women’s Cultural Centre, ‘These activities do not need money. They need commitment, motivation and organisational skills’.

Others believed that it was important to receive funds, especially if the aim was to reach the poorest of the poor. But they also believed that a donor’s intervention could be in contradiction with the objectives of the NGO and the culture and social norms of the community. Therefore, they were only prepared to receive funds from the state and other institutions conditional to the transparency of the aim of the donor. As was pointed out by Fatemeh Shabani, ‘Otherwise, they can be under the influence of the state and other institutions both nationally and internationally and divert from their commitment to the community’.

Some women's NGOs were in favour of receiving funds from the state and other institutions. For example, Marzieh Seddighi argued that: ‘If an NGO is taking weight off the shoulders of the state, it is the responsibility of the state and other institutions nationally and internationally to help these organisations’.

Others believed that the role of NGOs is to facilitate the creation of funds and provide opportunities for local participation and sustainable development. Catherine Razavi, a leading member of the Centre for Sustainable Development, gave an example: ‘Our NGO provided a water pump for the village. We asked the members of the community to regularly collect money from the community for the repayment of the loan and, instead of paying us their debt, to put the money in the Sustainable Development Fund to be used for other purposes. At the annual meeting of the village we elected one woman and one man as the representatives of each household to be responsible for the Fund’.

Women’s NGOs, an extension of the women’s movement

In the 1990s women's issues became an integral part of the politics of the Islamic state and society. Four crucial factors led to the creation of the women's movement:
1) Women's massive participation in the 1978-1979 revolution.
2) Women's collective actions in the mosques to produce food communally and to provide medical aid for the soldiers during the Iran-Iraq war.
3) The imposition of hejab (Islamic dress code) and sex segregation, which ironically opened up opportunities for many religious women to participate in political life.
4) The growing contradictions in the Islamic institutions, which led to the gradual development of a feminist consciousness. Despite structural limitations on the social activities in which they could engage, women of different classes and different levels of religiosity and secularity have been able to challenge the social construction of gender through the women's movement and women's NGOs. [40]

Feminist writers have long criticised the inclusion of gender issues in development agendas unless these challenge women's subordination. [41] Economic and other institutions and the wider society's cultural restrictions may deny women the space to articulate their own specific needs. However, women's NGOs in Iran, which are an extension of the women’s movement, have created a space of their own, separate from the state and the market, within which some women can have access to work and other resources. This has had an empowering impact. They are also challenging women's subordination by confronting the state and other patriarchal institutions (family, education, employment). They have made some gains by broadening their activities to include attempts at advocacy or policy influence. The detailed analysis of women's activities highlights the slow yet steady change in gender consciousness, self-confidence, and self-determination. Below I will discuss different examples to illustrate how a number of women's NGOs have provided opportunities for women's empowerment and are paving the way for the establishment of alternative civil society organisations.

Strategies to help women's access to employment and income generation in urban areas

In urban areas, many women's NGOs are involved in helping women to gain access to employment and income-generating activities. In order to assess the impact of their work, I asked a number of female NGO activists how they integrate gender analysis in practice.

Marzieh Seddighi, of the Women’s Work Creation Centre, has concentrated on providing information for the growing number of female university graduates who are seeking employment in an increasingly competitive job market. As she put it: ‘Historically men, even if poorer...have more access to information, money, and finances. Women don't have these opportunities. We therefore set up a committee consisting of bank managers, financial advisers, and female NGO activists to help women gain access to employment or income generation. We also organise workshops for women who are interested in entering business and trade, and we provide them with information and knowledge about how to acquire loans and financial assistance’.

Fatemeh Shabani, of Female Enterprise, was involved in similar activities: ‘The authorities and officials who are the decision makers are usually men and they do not cooperate with women to facilitate their activities. Despite these difficulties, I have witnessed many women who have entered this profession with an empty hand and have succeeded through hard work. I have also seen some men who have entered this profession with many opportunities at their disposal and have failed. Women have learnt that they can fail, but then they can get back up and start again. Women gain experience of managerial skills on a day-to-day basis by feeding the family, getting the hole in the ceiling fixed or helping the children with their homework. Women use these skills, which is the key to their success’.

Mahbobeh Abbasgholizadeh, of the Association of Women Writers and Journalists, was involved in income-generating activities and policy influence. In 2000, a large number of newspapers and magazines were closed down. Her aim was to support and facilitate the work of unemployed female media workers. ‘I did not give them money’, she says. ‘I organised projects and exhibitions and suggested that they do work for those. I provided them with computers and cameras. Once they completed these projects and the exhibitions, they benefited intellectually and financially.' Through her activities, she has also raised the issue of women's right to work and the undemocratic nature of the closure of newspapers and journals.

Khadijeh Moghadam is a leading member of the Women's Society Against Environmental Pollution. She works with female-headed households in the poorer areas of the south of Tehran, combining income-generating activities with consciousness-raising discussion groups about environmental issues. She has provided women with sewing machines and other materials to produce pencil cases, school bags, and carrier bags. As she explained: ‘These women regularly visit their local schools and their neighbours and discuss with them the environmental consequences of using plastics. They try to convince school children and their parents to replace plastic items with cloth materials. This way, besides raising awareness on environmental issues, they sell their products and earn a living’.

The strategies and policies of these women's NGOs for increasing women's access to employment and ways of generating income highlight the multiple pressures that women are facing in the household, family, and community. They also show how, through establishing organisations and alliances, women can achieve their goals.

Income-generating activities through women's clubs and cooperatives in rural areas

In rural areas the majority of projects are run by Governmental Organisations (GOs) and NGOs, several of which are sponsored by international bodies. One such example is the women's clubs, set up by the Ministries of Agriculture and Reconstruction Crusade with the help of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). These clubs have provided opportunities for women to have access to information, training, and income generating work. Parvin Maroofi, from the Institute for Research, Consultation and Marketing of Women's Products, summarises the benefits of such activities as follows: ‘Many women through these clubs were able to earn from growing fresh flowers, vegetables, and herbs. These projects not only provided these young women with income, they were able to work communally, which gave them an identity separate from individual young women waiting to be married’.

Maroofi was also actively involved with the Rural Women's Cooperatives. In the spring of 2002, I visited the Noavaran Women's Handicraft Cooperative in Garmsar, in north-east Iran. Sodabeh Golvari, a member of the cooperative, told me that: ‘The cooperatives have provided opportunities for women to sell their products in the national markets by organising exhibitions. The involvement of women in producing for the market has increased the income of the family. This has created more harmony in the family rather than conflict. In the past, men went to the market and sold the products of women. Now they look after the home and children while women go to towns and cities to exhibit their products and sell them’.

Women's involvement in clubs and cooperatives has been widely debated. For instance, Mayoux's study of a number of cooperatives in India highlights their exploitative nature. [42] It is important to recognise that these case studies from Iran constitute only a small percentage of rural women's involvement. For example, at the time of this research (2001-2002) there were 100 rural women's cooperatives officially registered, and 2000 female development workers. [43] This is a significant number, if we assume that these projects are empowering women, but needs to be set against the fact that there are 60,000 rural villages and some 11,421,320 rural women. There is no question therefore, that for women's NGOs to overcome the massive and diverse nature of poverty, oppression, and subordination of women, fundamental structural change is required. Nevertheless, the creation of women's rural clubs and cooperatives has, in some communities, changed traditional values that were biased against women.

Income generation and sustaining tribal life through participatory approaches

Through participatory approaches, income generation and female participation, the Hableh Rood project, known as the Management of Land and Water, aims to protect the environment in north-east Iran. A number of organisations are involved in this project, both as advisory and fundraising bodies and as facilitators. These include the UNDP, the Ministries of Agriculture and Reconstruction Crusade, and the Tehran Mehr Foundation women's NGO.

Jaleh Shadi Talab, editor in chief of Women’s Research, a quarterly Journal of The Centre for Women’s Studies at Tehran University, was a former adviser to the project, and explains how the already existing traditional women's informal organisations made the participatory approach successful: ‘Women regularly get together on Thursday evenings to collectively perform a religious duty, that is to read Doaye Komail (a form of praying), which is considered to bring luck to the community. This is also a social gathering for many women; they eat food and drink tea together and discuss their issues and share their problems with each other’.

For some weeks, Jaleh participated in these gatherings and raised the issue of income generation. Finally, the women welcomed the idea and decided to set up the Rural Women's Bank so that they could take out low-interest loans in order to set up small businesses for themselves.

In some communities, men, women, and the clergy objected to the involvement of women in development projects, in particular to women and men working in a non-segregated way. Fatemeh Mafi, the director of education and a participant in this project from the Ministry of Reconstruction Crusade, explained: ‘Our strategy was to deal with cultural issues with women's and men's cooperation. In some areas, we gradually managed to get more and more women involved in the project. In other areas, men, women, and the clergy resisted. Therefore, we pulled out because we believed that we could not force them to do what they did not want to do’.

Mansoureh Khalily, a leading member of Mehr Foundation, has also been involved with these projects. The Foundation provides funds and resources to enable women to work according to their skills and abilities. She told me: ‘Khorshid Khanom escaped from her violent husband and came to our organisation for help. I asked her to describe her skills. She said that she could bake bread. We provided her with an oven and now she provides bread for the whole village and has not allowed her violent husband to return home’.

Since 1979, Catherine Razavi, executive director of the Centre for Sustainable Development, has been involved with different projects using participatory approaches in rural areas and among tribal communities. The prospect of water and food insecurity is very real, with grave implications for tribal communities. To sustain rural and tribal life, Razavi has involved local women in the design and the construction of a prototype solar water heater and solar box cookers. She says that: ‘Local women have been practising the use of solar energy in their own traditional way for centuries. For example, dried herbs, vegetables, and fruit are all prepared by leaving them in the sun. Women can, therefore, relate to this technology and are modifying their local recipes to suit the solar box cooker’.

Participatory discourses, methods, and practices have been criticised by many academics and practitioners. [44] The Iranian case studies demonstrate that these women's NGOs have succeeded to a limited extent in incorporating home workers into formal wage labour. Such a strategy has assisted women in getting away from the home and the isolation of housework. In some tribal areas, women's NGOs have successfully engaged women in sustaining tribal and rural livelihoods through local knowledge. As mentioned above, this is the result of these women's NGOs being an extension of the women's movement in Iran, and at the centre of their policy and practice is the goal of challenging women's subordination.

Women's NGO Networking

There are a number of women's NGOs networking in Iran, including for example, the Communication Network of Women's NGOs (CNWN), the Women's NGOs' Network, and the Zaynab Kobra Foundation. They attempt to provide information to women's NGOs and make connections between NGOs and national and international institutions. There is also the Centre for Women's Participation, a governmental organisation (GO) that offers a support system for women's NGOs, provides funds, and makes connections between NGOs, GOs and international institutions. These networking organisations have a maternalistic and top-down approach and could be criticised for promoting their own agendas rather than those that are in the interests of the community.

However, some of my interviewees were in favour of these organisations, for example, the religious minorities’ (Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Armenian) women's NGOs that are engaged in provision of income generating activities in their communities according to their religion and ethnic boundaries. Through networking with other women’s NGOs and GOs they have been able to raise their gender/ethnicity demands, which are culturally and religiously specific. One important form of discrimination against minorities under the Islamic state is the Dieh (Blood Money). According to Article 881 and Articles 10 and 59 of civil law, one twelfth of the Dieh is applied to religious minorities. This means that if a member of a religious minority accidentally kills a Muslim s/he has to pay the full Dieh to the person’s family. But if a Muslim accidentally kills a member of a religious minority's s/he only pays one twelfth of Dieh to the family of the dead person. According to this law, the Blood Money of all women is half of that of men, a provision which discriminates particularly against women from religious minorities. Throughout the 1990s, the minority women’s NGOs, together with other women’s NGOs and GOs, campaigned for the reform of this law and succeeded in changing it in favour of minorities in August 2002. Following this victory, women’s NGOs in collaboration with women’s rights lawyers and female members of Majles (Parliament) are pressing for the same Blood Money for men and women. This is a major challenge by women across ethnic and religious identities to traditional Islamic laws in Iran. [45]

Networking between some women's NGOs and GOs has established the basis for organising women across religious and ethnic boundaries. This alliance, in turn, has allowed them to act collectively to pressure the state and other patriarchal institutions to change laws and regulations in their favour. These activities are also a great step towards the general democratisation of institutions both within the state and in civil society.

Provision of resources to the marginalised sections of society

Disabled people constitute about 10 per cent of the Iranian population, and most of them live in poverty. The Ladies' Charitable Society provides care for disabled people over 16 years of age in the south of Tehran. This institution is one of the oldest NGOs in Iran and has been mobilising female voluntary workers since 1972. In 2001-2002, the organisation created 2000 voluntary and 1000 paid jobs for women, and most of the people the Society cares for are women. The main reason for this is the fact that in most cases husbands are older than their wives. Women look after men when they become old or develop disabilities. Men do not reciprocate. Ehteram Malakoti Nejad, a prominent member of this NGO, explained: ‘We have had a number of cases where disabled women were left alone because their husbands married younger and healthier women. Therefore our institution, which is run by women, serves more women than men, because women need more care.'

Female suicide, addiction, and street children

Fatemeh Farhangkhah is an active member of the Society for the Protection of Socially Disadvantaged Individuals. The alarming rise in the number of victims of addiction, homelessness and suicide since the mid-1990s persuaded her to work in this field. She organises lectures and seminars in various working-class areas of Tehran, where these social problems are most acute. She believes that: ‘Access to information is empowering. It enables families to overcome their isolation and understand that these issues are social problems that can be eradicated.'

According to Farhangkhah, the largest number of female suicides have occurred in Ilam (one of the poorest regions of Iran) and Esfehan (one of the most traditional cities in the country). If we see suicide, especially when the victims set fire to themselves, as a form of social protest and a rejection of the status quo, why have these incidents occurred in such regions? Farhangkhah explains that: ‘Forced and arranged marriages are common causes of suicide among women in these regions. These are in many ways traditional and religious women but they are rejecting forced and arranged marriages’.

The number of young girls who run away from home is also increasing. Some become sex workers and others become street children. A number of women’s NGOs are concerned for their welfare and have pressured the state to take responsibility for street children and female sex workers. These NGOs offer a variety of services to street children, disabled and older women and victims of suicide and drugs, in ways that address the issues of women’s subordination. They also campaign to raise women’s voices at the level of state and other patriarchal institutions.

Policy influence

Between 1979 and the early 1990s, women were not allowed to be judges, and the law gave men the exclusive right to divorce and have custody of children. Since the early 1990s and until today, as a result of pressure from below and through the efforts of female lawyers and members of parliament, a number of reforms have been made. Women are now allowed to be research judges or investigative judges and reforms have been made in laws regarding marriage, divorce, and custody of children. However, many women under pressure from patriarchal gender relations do not benefit from this reform. Shirin Ebadi explains that: ‘Under pressure from men and the family, many women do not exercise their rights to custody of children. Under these circumstances, men re-marry and the children from the previous marriage could suffer as a result of domestic violence. In one particular case a child died, so our NGO organised a memorial in the local mosque and asked the local people to attend the memorial and bring flowers to the memory of the child. We explained that the child’s life could have been saved if she was not taken away from her mother. We argued that the law should be reformed further to give custody of the children to the suitable parent. We asked our audience to leave the flowers in the mosque if they agreed with such a reform. As everyone left, we found the floor of the mosque covered with flowers’.

Community support for reform of traditional laws and regulations in favour of women, combined with the efforts of female lawyers and women’s NGOs, made it possible for Leila Davar, a female judge, to start working on a bench of the State Retribution Organisation in Esfehan in February 2003, after 24 years. This is an important victory for women in Iran. If more women work as judges, there will be more reforms to family laws and regulations from which women, men and children will benefit equally.

Noushin Ahmadi Khorasani’s aim is to press for reform of traditional laws through women’s participation. On international women’s day, she helps to organise postcard campaigns demanding legislative reform. She explains: ‘For many ordinary women, the thought of writing to members of parliament and the judiciary is a daunting experience. This way thousands of cards were sent to the authorities, raising many women’s voices protesting against laws which are oppressive to women.’

Thus, in terms of policy influence over social welfare and gender equity, women’s rights advocates have made an impact by campaigning and taking gender issues to a wider public in a way that has made them worthy of attention.

In 2005, once again female activists took the initiative to use the period prior to the presidential election to raise their demands. According to Mahbobeh Abbasgholizadeh, ‘We were in favour of participating in the election and not boycotting it. Not because we were convinced by the male candidates, but to force them to acknowledge women’s rights demands, to understand that women’s rights are equal to democracy and we reject the idea that democracy is first and women’s rights are second and we succeeded in doing this. Our aim was to show that our movement is diverse, but we are an independent movement and united in raising our voices, and will continue our struggle until all our demands are met’.

During this period 89 Women activists declared themselves as candidates for the presidential election. This was to challenge the constitution which does not allow a woman to be president of the Islamic state. Following this, democracy and women’s rights activists staged a number of sit-ins and demonstrations. Among them were Azam Taleghani, a Muslim woman who has long fought for women’s rights and democracy, Shadi Sadr, a female lawyer, Marzieh Mortazi, a women’s rights activist and Mahbobeh Abbasgholizadeh, an NGO and civil society activist who was arrested in November 2004 for her women’s rights and civil society activities, including attending Beijing Plus Ten conferences in Asia and the European Social Forum in London in October 2004.

In one of these demonstrations women activists entered Azadi (Freedom) Football stadium when Iran were playing against Bahrain. There is a VIP section in this stadium where sometimes VIP women watch football. Some women demonstrators had VIP cards but they did not use them. They all tried to enter from the public entrance. They clashed with the police who tried to close the door on them and some of them were injured: Mahbobeh Abbasgholizadeh was left with a broken leg. But they entered the stadium shouting their slogans ‘Freedom (referring to the stadium) we have entered, not as VIPs, but as ordinary citizens’, and, ‘Iran will win with our presence’. The Iranian team won and the activists shouted: ‘Iran’s football team is on its way to the World Cup; we women are on our way to win our citizenship rights’.

On another occasion, 700 women demonstrated outside Tehran University. Nushin Ahmadi Khorasani, the leading member of the Women’s Cultural Centre NGO, who established the First Women’s Library in Iran, ended this gathering by reading the women’s statement. This called for women’s protest to continue until gender equality, as well as religious and ethnic minority equality, is guaranteed by the constitution.

These women’s rights activists are diverse individuals and groups. They argue that they will continue their struggle until the male reading of the Islamic laws, including rejecting women as president, is changed. In another demonstration outside the President’s office, their slogans read: ‘To reject women is to reject half of the population; we do not accept men’s choices; gender equality is the necessity of life; women’s rights are human rights…’ Azam Taleghani turned to the police who were surrounding the women and said to them: ‘Thank you brothers for allowing us to raise our voices. We will be here forever to continue our struggle and you will have to cooperate with us’.

However, the result of the presidential election in June 2005 was a lesson and a challenge for the women’s movement. The majority of the population voted for President Ahmadinejad, the conservative candidate, not for religious purposes but for economic reasons. He did not call for a greater process of Islamisation; he stood for resolving economic problems. The leadership of the reform movement failed across the board to take this up. In fact the root of their failure lay in their inactivity during the 2000–2004 local and parliamentary elections, which they boycotted, and the fact that they concentrated on political and social issues and ignored economic issues which affected a large number of working people.

As was discussed above, by the late 1990s, the reformist administration was following the major proponents of the free market economy by curtailing the role of the state and encouraging privatisation. Therefore, the vote for the president elect was a protest vote by some of the poorer sections of the population against the reformist government, which moved to a free market economy and attempted to shrink the Islamic social welfare system.

The women human rights activists are convinced that the victories of the conservatives in political institutions highlight the limitations of the leadership of the reform movement and their defeat, but not the defeat of the democracy movement itself. They believe that the women’s movement and the democracy movement will continue its struggle for democracy and reform and the conservative administration will have no choice but to meet the demands of the majority of the population, including their own supporters.

However, they will be far more able to press for their democratic demands if they have a much clearer economic programme which addresses the needs of the poor. Also, a minority of intellectuals including activists such as Shirin Ebadi, the winner of Nobel Peace Prize 2003, boycotted the election on the grounds that it was not legitimate because the Council of Guardians, a male/clergy dominated institution, rejected female candidates. But the participation of the majority of the population, mainly women and young people, indicated that the boycott of local and parliamentary elections in 2003-4 and the presidential election of 2005 was a wrong tactic.

Finally, it is important to conclude that the international responses to events in Iran can also have a negative impact on the democracy and women’s movements. For 25 years women’s rights activists have been trying to construct emancipatory models that derive from their own experiences and have achieved a great deal. Constant threats of sanctions, war and regime changes from the US and Israel and their supporters in Europe and Britain weakens the women’s movement and the democracy movement in Iran. Iranians are proud of their country and they are determined to protect its independence. If there was a choice between believing in either Washington or Tehran, then the majority of people in Iran, even those who are critical of the Islamic state and the Islamisation of society, would choose Tehran. This view has strengthened in the last 12 months as Washington’s position in Iraq and Afghanistan and Israel’s position in Palestine have been discredited more than ever before.

Conclusion

One important impact of the hegemony of globalisation and liberalisation is market growth development, a limited role for the state, privatisation and an increase in the number of NGOs. This reflects the change in global development policy over the last 4 decades. Throughout the 1990s–2005, the Iranian state as a rentier state and an interventionist state was able to reform political and economic systems as the precondition for transition to market-oriented regime, privatisation and NGOisation. On the other hand, the state invested in public services which led to significant improvements in health, education and employment.

The main contribution of my empirical work to the debate on gender and employment is the insight that the role of the state and other institutions and its gender ideology alone does not determine the inclusion or exclusion of women. The role of local and global economy is also significant. I have demonstrated that in Iran, gender relations changed in response to indigenous and global eco¬nomic circumstances and women’s struggle for change. The Islamic state remained the agent of economic development; it maintained capital while strengthening patriarchal relation¬ships in accordance with its gender ideology.

An analysis of social relations of gender under the Islamic state also allowed me to focus on the relationship between women's employment experiences and gender relations in the home and the wider society. Women are not confined and isolated within the domestic space, but, similar to other countries around the globe, women are integrated into the workforce differently from men in terms of wage rates and promotion practices. In the process of economic development, patriarchal gender relations have a great impact on women's employment. Nevertheless, patriarchal social relations have had to be dynamic. The Islamic state's determination to base gender roles on a traditional interpretation of Shari’a failed and it was forced to be pragmatic. Gendered laws and beliefs were changed in response to change in economic circumstances and women's struggle. More importantly, the interaction between eco¬nomic and ideological factors led to gender consciousness and women's struggle for change. This is important because, despite extensive critique, west¬ern ahistorical ethnocentric depictions of Muslim societies, in which women in Iran appear as the ultimate manifestation of female oppression, frequently prevail.

I have demonstrated that the level of gender consciousness is much greater in 2005, under the Islamic state, than it was at the height of socio-economic transformation and westerni¬sation in the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore, the subordination of women in Iran cannot be attributed solely to Islamic ideology and practice. It has to be analysed within a wider perspective, which involves material circumstances and change in gender relations.

The case studies presented in this paper illustrate that the women's movement is working with women in urban and rural areas. In the form of NGOs, they provide work for many women, paving the way for women in rural areas to have access to marketing their goods and earning a wage. They are also engaged in policy influence on social welfare and are engaging women in sustaining rural and tribal livelihoods. They have been able to do this through raising gender issues at the level of state and other institutions in both rural and the urban sectors. Therefore, the women’s movement, in a variety of ways has confronted gender inequality both directly and indirectly. They have made important qualitative shifts in the relationship between civil society and the state. As industrial workers, unpaid workers, low-paid workers, home workers, NGO workers, Muslims, Armenians, Jews or Zoroastrians, women carry multiple identities. Hence their involvement in the women's movement and the democracy movement has provided them with the opportunity to deal with the whole spectrum of their interests.

Endnotes

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