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Why Are You So Surprised?
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By Simon Enoch |
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"While the Bush regime is no doubt uniquely unapologetic in its penchant for unilateral aggression, in its contempt for international law, and in its assault on civil and human rights, these are not traits that recent Democratic leaders would find all that unfamiliar (or undesirable)."
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To listen to many Democrats and liberal commentators, George W Bush is an especially ugly aberration in the history of the presidential office. This liberal line of argument posits the hijacking of a once benign U.S. foreign policy by Bush and his neoconservative cabal thereby sullying the good name of America abroad while simultaneously reeking untold havoc at home. Familiar are screeds such as those of the Rev. Jesse Jackson who assails the Bush administration for a foreign policy driven by “neoconservative zealots who openly proclaim the desire for an American Empire, in violation of our entire history.” [1] However, such pronouncements rest on a particularly myopic view of American imperial history. According to this line of reasoning American imperialism is a deviation peculiar to the Bush administration alone. Therefore, we need only to substitute Bush with a Democratic leader to correct America’s deviant course thereby restoring the United States’ international reputation and reversing the current repressive thrust of domestic policy at home. The U.S. needs only a “change of course” and all will be right again. [2] Given this narrative, many liberal Democrats cannot seem to fathom why their current leadership consistently fails to denounce the war in Iraq in the boldest possible terms and seems unwilling to advocate a complete and speedy withdrawal of American troops from occupied Iraq. [3] My question to these Democrats is, “why are you so surprised?” It seems Democrats and their attendant commentators are guilty either of a glaring ignorance or collective amnesia when it comes to assessing the policy records of past Democratic leaders. While the Bush regime is no doubt uniquely unapologetic in its penchant for unilateral aggression, in its contempt for international law, and in its assault on civil and human rights, these are not traits that recent Democratic leaders would find all that unfamiliar (or undesirable). Indeed while much is made of the Bush “anomaly,” Democrats need to be cognizant of the striking similarities between the two parties’ leadership on these issues. This paper will attempt to outline these similarities primarily within the arena of U.S. foreign policy, though issues of domestic repression will also be considered. More importantly, this paper will suggest that both the Democratic and Republican leadership concur on the goals of U.S. foreign policy and that disagreements between the two are entirely tactical rather than fundamental in nature. Ultimately, I argue that the inability to perceive this stems from the failure of American liberals to comprehend the underlying imperatives of American imperialism that drive U.S. foreign policy; imperatives that both the Republican and Democratic leadership are in complete agreement with. Confronting U.S. foreign policy decisions from this perspective may go some way to explaining the reluctance of the Democratic leadership to take a hard stance on a war that seeks to accomplish objectives that they remain fully in favour of. In outlining this argument, it is essential that we recognize the remarkable consistency of U.S. foreign policy objectives throughout the nation’s history. Speaking of the primary objectives of U.S. imperialism, John Bellamy Foster and Robert McChesney observe: The primary goals of U.S. imperialism have always been to open up investment opportunities to U.S. corporations and to allow such corporations to gain preferential access to crucial natural resources. Inasmuch as such expansion promotes U.S. hegemony it tends to increase the international competitiveness of U.S. firms and the profits they enjoy. [4] Indeed, irrespective of administration, these objectives have been deemed paramount to securing U.S. economic prosperity and supremacy. As Andrew Bacevich argues: For all the peculiarities in style and temper distinguishing McKinley from Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft from Wilson, or Warren G. Harding from Calvin Coolidge, each of those presidents had adhered to a common strategy…the centerpiece of that strategy was economic expansionism. Implementing that strategy involved ‘pushing and holding open doors in all parts of the world with all the engines of government ranging from polite coercion to the use of arms.’ [5] Certainly the objectives of economic expansionism did not diminish with the onset of the Cold War. George Keenan, head of U.S State department planning under Truman offered this now infamous rationale for U.S. foreign policy post World War 2: [W]e have about 50% of the world's wealth but only 6.3% of its population. This disparity is particularly great between ourselves and the peoples of Asia. In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security. [6] Indeed, despite official pronouncements to the contrary, the American military machine during the Cold War was always less about containing the Soviet threat and more about ensuring stable economic relations, opening up markets, and gaining preferential access to foreign resources in order to facilitate capital accumulation on terms favourable to the United States. Bacevich concludes: To conceive of U.S. grand strategy from the late 1940s through the 1980s as “containment” – with no purpose apart from resisting the spread of Soviet power – is not wrong, but it is incomplete…In short, U.S. grand strategy during the Cold War required not only containing communism but also taking active measures to open up the world politically, culturally, and above all, economically – which is precisely what policymakers said they intended to do. [7] Post Cold War, U.S. foreign policy remains an instrument to maintain a set of relations conducive to U.S. interests. According to William Robinson: U.S. foreign policy is aimed at assuring the stability of a given set of economic, social and political arrangements within each country in which the U.S. intervenes, and in the international system as a whole. The stability of arrangements and relations which girder an international system in which the United States has enjoyed a dominant position is seen as essential to U.S. interests, or “national security.” When these arrangements are threatened, U.S. policy attempts to undercut the threat. [8] Such pronouncements find ample support in the documentary record of U.S. military planners post-Cold War. Thus, Marine Corp General A.M. Gray observed in May 1990 that the U.S. must maintain a “credible military power projection capability with the flexibility to respond to conflict…across the globe to ensure unimpeded access both to developing economic markets…and to the resources needed to support our manufacturing requirements.” [9] Similarly, General Peter Pace, former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command, notes the priority of maintaining capitalist socio-economic relations and the unhindered access to Latin American markets by U.S. transnationals in the Post-Cold War period. [10] Explaining the need for U.S. military intervention in Colombia, Pace emphasized the need to maintain a “continued stability required for access to markets in the USSOUTHCOM AOR [area of responsibility], which is critical to the continued economic expansion and prosperity of the United States.” [11] The above lends proof to the dictum of former Secretary of State Colin Powell that, "Money is a coward -- it won't go where it doesn't feel safe." [12] It thereby falls to the American military to ensure the continued safety of U.S. foreign investment. Thus, as this brief review suggests, the end of a bi-polar world has not negated the historical need for the U.S. military to act to secure favourable conditions for U.S. investment. If anything, the window of opportunity afforded by the collapse of a rival superpower has only hastened the urgency to fashion a global economic order conducive to U.S. interests. However, the elimination of the constraints of the Cold War has dramatically altered the parameters of possible U.S. actions to secure these ends. Certainly, with the demise of the former Soviet Union, the United States found it possible to increasingly militarize its foreign policy, as the possibility of superpower confrontation diminished. [13] Indeed the new realities of American military pre-eminence in the post-Cold War environment were recognized almost immediately. Dimitri Simes, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, speaking in 1988 keenly observed that with the Russians out of the way, it should be possible to: [L]iberate American foreign policy from the strait-jacket of superpower hostility… making military power more useful as a United States foreign policy instrument…against those who contemplate challenging important American interests. [14] That military action has become increasingly desirable as a vehicle for U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War world is borne out by the evidence. The U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century reported in 1999 that, “since the end of the Cold War, the United States has embarked upon nearly four dozen military interventions…as opposed to only 16 during the entire period of the Cold War.” [15] Note that these interventions are pre-Bush Junior, the majority of which were presided over by a Democratic administration. Thus the enthusiasm to resort to military aggression to further U.S. foreign policy goals is not emblematic of the Bush administration alone. Rather, it is merely the latest manifestation of U.S. foreign policy due to the post-Cold War realities that has unshackled American military power now that no formidable deterrent exists. Indeed, Clinton’s foreign policy can be considered a sort of incubator for the policies now witnessed under the Bush administration. Many of the hallmarks of the Bush doctrine that current liberals decry--unilateralism, contempt for international law, a reckless nuclear policy, the weaponization of space, not to mention using terrorism as a pre-text to enact repressive laws at home--were carried out by the Clinton administration. As will be shown there is a remarkable consistency in the trajectory of foreign policy under both Clinton and Bush Jr. in regards to these issues. Furthermore, the majority of Democratic leadership hopefuls have shown little or no apprehension regarding these trends in U.S. foreign policy. Thus, I think it can be competently argued that the differences that do exist between the two parties in matters of foreign policy are a matter of degree, rather than kind. The Clinton regime could be characterized as the first post-Cold War administration to fully comprehend and act on the new geo-political realities created by the demise of the Soviet Union to fully militarize U.S. foreign policy. As Bacevich argues, while the Bush senior administration continued to adhere somewhat to the dictates of U.S. Cold War foreign policy, the Clinton administration recognized that it could jettison some of the older forms of Cold War statecraft to fashion a more muscular, unilateral foreign policy. [16] Indeed, the Clinton administration’s first foray into military action was taken unilaterally, when in supposed retaliation for an Iraqi plot to assassinate Bush Sr., twenty-three cruise missiles were launched at an Iraqi intelligence HQ in downtown Baghdad. [17] In what has become a somewhat familiar narrative, Secretary Albright justified the attack by appealing to Article 51 in the U.N. Charter which authorizes the use of force in self-defense against armed attack until the Security Council can take further action. Such “self-defense” is authorized when “its necessity is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.” [18] As Noam Chomsky observes, “to invoke Article 51 to justify bombing Baghdad two months after an alleged assassination attempt on a former president scarcely rises to the level of absurdity.” [19] The absurdity of the justification notwithstanding, American commentators clearly recognized that the Clinton administration was embarking on a praise-worthy new path now that American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era was no longer “hog-tied by the constraints of multilateralism.” [20] Indeed, as if to emphasize this new reality, the Clinton-era Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review explicitly states that the United States will resort to the unilateral use of military power to ensure, among other things, “uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies and key strategic resources.” [21] The Clinton administration would further demonstrate its disdain for international law during the NATO aggression against the former Yugoslavia. While the Clinton administration invoked the rhetoric of humanitarian intervention to justify the attack, Clinton himself half let the cat out of the bag when he remarked, “If we’re going to have a strong economic relationship that includes our ability to sell around the world, Europe has got to be a key…That’s what this Kosovo thing is all about.” [22] While it is beyond the purview of this paper to investigate the reasons behind the action beyond the rhetoric of humanitarian intervention, many competent observers argue that the U.S. used the Kosovo opportunity to ensure the cohesion of NATO and “reestablish European dependence on American power.” [23] Indeed, the insistence of the United States to abjure international legal norms by emphasizing the imminent humanitarian catastrophe unless immediate action was taken allowed it to free NATO military operations from UN control and legality. [24] That the U.S. fundamentally violated international law to achieve these objectives is not in doubt. As Peter Gowan notes, there is no serious dispute that from the standpoint of international law; the NATO action was a “legal violation of the cornerstone of international order.” [25] Even apologists had to acknowledge the war as “illegal but legitimate.” [26] Gowan observes that the aggression violated multiple international agreements. First and foremost, the attack constituted a “gross violation of Yugoslavia’s sovereignty: it was an act of unprovoked aggression by a coalition of states against a sovereign state. It was thus a clear breach of the U.N. Charter and had no mandate whatever from the U.N. Security Council.” [27] As Danilo Zolo argues, this action was indeed precedent setting: In previous cases, countries promoting military interventions had sought to justify their decision by appealing to international law and soliciting and in one way or another obtaining a posteriori the approval of the Security Council of the United Nations. In the case of the war for Kosovo, NATO instead first threatened to use force and then actually did so without even beginning to go through the formalities required to obtain an authorization from the Security Council. [28] Secondly, the attack also violated the NATO-Russia Founding Act, designed to make NATO enlargement into Poland more acceptable to Russia by imposing limits on NATO actions, such as observing international law, refraining from the threat or use of force against other states and respecting the primary responsibility of the U.N. Security Council for maintaining international peace and security. [29] Clearly the NATO aggression violated all of these provisions. Further criminalizing NATO’s actions was the bombing of non-military targets in which public transportation, factories, food-processing plants, hospitals, schools, museums, churches, monasteries and farms were all deemed legitimate targets. “They ran out of military targets in the first couple of weeks,” said James Bissett, former Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia. “It was common knowledge that NATO went to stage three: civilian targets.” [30] Through these actions, the U.S. effectively illustrated to the world that it was “not obliged to seek compromise or to convince others when it comes to the exercise of power.” [31] While the U.S. still operated through albeit a compromised multilateral institution such as NATO, the precedent for future military intervention unrestrained by the constraints of international law was established. [32] The ramifications of this aggressive U.S. position were not lost on the rest of the world. While much is made of the Bush regime’s penchant to alienate allies and foster suspicion in countries around the globe, the NATO aggression versus Kosovo had much the same effect. Defense analysts observe that Operation Allied Force hastened efforts to create a “triangular strategic alliance” between Russia, China and India as a means to check U.S. military power. [33] In the wake of the NATO aggression, Russia and India expressed their “determined opposition to the unilateral use or threat of use of force in violation of the U.N. Charter, and to intervention in the internal affairs of other states, including under the guise of humanitarian intervention.” [34] All three nations argued strenuously for the primacy of the U.N. Security Council for dealing with world crises. [35] Further international scorn on the NATO actions came from the Declaration of the South Summit in 2000, “the highest-level meeting ever held by the former non-aligned movement, accounting for over 80 percent of the world’s population.” [36] With the bombing of Serbia in mind, the Declaration rejected the “so-called right of humanitarian intervention” and the “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” [37] The Clinton administration furthered its isolation in regards to world opinion when the U.S. and British governments launched Operation Desert Fox in a move to diminish and degrade Iraqi military capabilities. [38] The attack marked a significant elevation over previous air campaigns versus Iraq, with U.S. combat aircraft flying more than 600 sorties, American warships launching 330 cruise missiles and with B-52s delivering another 90 more. [39] The attacks were roundly condemned by the Arab League, China and Russia, with the latter recalling its ambassadors from both the U.S. and Britain. Even among NATO members the attacks received criticism. French Defense Minister Alain Richard stressed the “grave human consequences [the bombing] could have on the Iraqi population. [40] Thus the Clinton administration was certainly not unfamiliar with the ‘go-it-alone, international law-be-damned, you’re either with us or against us’ policies that liberals and Democrats condemn the current Bush administration for. While Clinton was perhaps more reticent to put American troops in harm’s way, a point I will address below, the trajectory for the sort of “cowboy” foreign policy of the current administration was “bequeathed” to Bush through the actions of the Clinton administration. Indeed, the above does not exhaust the affinities between the two administrations, or their leadership in general. Similarities also abound in regards to other issues of international peace and security. As Stephen Zunes observes, most of the international community has correctly blamed the Bush administration for the failure to advance the objectives of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. [41] However while the Bush administration may have “brought U.S. non-proliferation policy to new lows,” the Clinton administration also demonstrated reckless disregard over the spread of nuclear technology. According to Zunes, the Clinton administration was “even more lax than its Republican predecessors on controlling the exports of nuclear-related technology,” citing proposals by Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter that violated both the NPT and U.S. law regarding the transfers of American nuclear technology to India and Pakistan. [42] Clinton-era strategic nuclear policy could also be characterized as exceedingly reckless, as Clinton’s planners (STRATCOM) advised that Washington should portray itself as irrational in order to maximize the strategic value of nuclear weapons: The fact that some elements may appear to be potentially 'out of control' can be beneficial to creating and reinforcing fears and doubts within the minds of an adversary's decision makers. This essential sense of fear is the working force of deterrence. That the U.S. may become irrational and vindictive if its vital interests are attacked should be part of the national persona we project to all adversaries. [43] Furthermore, the document advised using the threat of first strike with nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, in clear violation of the NPT. [44] Like the current Bush administration, Clinton-era military strategy did not concern itself solely with earth-based weapons systems. Once again, while much is made of Bush’s “National Missile Defense” and the weaponization of space, these are the continuation of policies pursued by the Clinton administration. In 1996, the U.S. Space Command Vision for 2020 called for “dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect U.S. interests and investment.” The U.S. must therefore develop “space-based strike weapons [enabling] the application of precision force from, to, and through space.” Such weapons will be needed in order to quell unrest and violence emanating from the “have-nots” as “globalization of the economy” leads to a “widening economic divide” and “deepening economic stagnation, political instability, and cultural alienation.” [45] While the honesty of U.S. military planners regarding the true consequences of neo-liberal globalization here is striking, it also further illustrates that Democrat and Republican views on the exercise of military power, conventional or otherwise, are remarkably consistent, and certainly not in opposition. The last parallel I would like to consider is in regards to domestic repression and the erosion of civil liberties. With the institution of the PATRIOT Act, much commentary lamented the Bush assault on civil freedoms under the pre-text of protection from terrorism. Yet Clinton’s record on civil protections was alarming, and he too used the pre-text of terrorism, courtesy of the Oklahoma City bombing, to further undermine citizens’ rights. Indeed, journalist John Heilemann concluded that Clinton's record on individual rights was "breathtaking in its awfulness." He may be, writes Heilemann, "the worst civil liberties president since Richard Nixon." [46] Clinton’s counter-terrorism legislation, introduced in the wake of Oklahoma City, incorporated many of the provisions undermining civil freedoms that are so rightly criticized in PATRIOT. The legislation expanded already considerable federal law enforcement powers and contained a “breathtakingly broad definition of domestic terrorism,” that could selectively persecute individuals based on their political views. [47] Moreover, in terms that are now all too familiar, the legislation allowed citizens to be imprisoned, and non-citizens to be summarily deported, due to their support of humanitarian activities of any group that the Secretary of State might label as ‘terrorist.’ Non-citizens, including long-term legal residents could also be deported through secret proceedings based on secret evidence that the accused cannot see or respond to. Due to its sweeping violations of constitutional rights, the ACLU dubbed the legislation the “Ominous Counter-Constitution Act.” [48] Thus, with this legislation the Clinton administration laid the necessary groundwork for the more gregarious assault on civil liberties enacted by the Bush White House. While the above does not exhaust all of the similarities between the Clinton and Bush administrations, they nevertheless should be sufficient to support the claim that there exists a consistent trajectory between the two presidencies on these issues. Indeed, they also illustrate the extent to which differences among the administrations were a matter of degree rather than kind. However, should one view Clinton as an aberration also, we might also briefly look at some other Democratic contenders for presidential office to evaluate the extent to which they fundamentally differ with Bush style foreign policy. Unfortunately, here also the record shows continuity rather than opposition. Although many liberals felt the need to back John Kerry’s candidacy in a paroxysm of “anybody but Bush,” the Senator held some remarkably similar positions to the Bush administration. As Stephen Zunes has exhaustively demonstrated, Kerry and Bush evinced very little difference, beyond tactical considerations, in regards to foreign policy. Thus Kerry gave full support for the Bush invasion of Iraq, despite having access to information provided by respected strategic analysts, arms control experts, former U.N. inspectors and retired military officers that insisted that Iraq was not a threat to the United States and that its weapons-making capability had been degraded to the point of being virtually ineffectual. [49] This makes current Kerry accusations that he was “lied to” over Iraq all the more dubious, as if he had no access to alternative information. [50] Furthermore, Kerry voted against a compromise resolution on Iraq put forward by Democrat Carl Levin that would have authorized the use of force if it were to be sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council. Thus Kerry chose to abjure international law in favour of U.S. unilateral military action. [51] Indeed the entire Democratic Party platform adopted during the 2004 election showed little difference with Bush style foreign policy beyond disagreements over strategy. The platform defended the illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq while complaining that the Bush administration “did not send sufficient forces to accomplish the mission.” [52] Kerry has even managed to out-hawk the Bush Republicans in regards to his support for Israel in the conflict with Palestine. Kerry criticized the Bush administration when it raised concerns over the construction of illegal Israeli settlements in occupied Palestine, condemning the administration’s refusal to veto UN security resolutions upholding the Fourth Geneva Conventions and other international legal principles regarding Israeli settlement efforts. [53] While Kerry consciously followed a strategy of criticizing the execution of the war in Iraq while not condemning the war itself, what about Howard Dean, the supposed “anti-war” candidate? [54] As Joshua Frank has demonstrated, Dean’s credentials as an antiwar candidate were more media fantasy than reality. Indeed Dean had championed many of the U.S. military interventions in the past, regardless of their legality. According to Frank, Dean [P]raised the first Gulf War, NATO’s intervention in Bosnia, [and] Clinton’s bombings of Sudan and Iraq…Dean confessed to President Clinton, ‘I think your policy up to this date has been absolutely correct…Since it is clearly no longer possible to take action in conjunction with NATO and the United Nations, I have reluctantly concluded that we must take unilateral action.’ [55] In regards to Iraq, while Dean certainly criticized the decision to invade, he did not dispute the assumption that the U.S. had the right to act militarily against a sovereign nation. Dean admitted that had the Bush administration produced accurate intelligence that Iraq harboured weapons of mass destruction, he would have supported U.S. intervention, even without U.N. authorization. However as Frank rightly observes, Dean failed to acknowledge that the U.N. Charter forbids member countries from attacking another country except in self-defense, a technicality that does little to dissuade the bravado of unilateralists, Dean among them. [56] Finally, we might turn to the future of the Democratic Party to see if there exists the potential to break with the consistent doctrine outlined above. Many Democrats perceive Hillary Clinton as the front-runner to win the Democratic nomination in 2008. Unfortunately, Clinton shows little signs of breaking with the hawkish foreign policy stance embraced by her male forbearers. Thus, Clinton “fully supported” the Bush administration’s Iraq policy in the run-up to war and has only recently (three years later) labelled her vote to “authorize the war a mistake, even though the underlying rationale -- weapons of mass destruction -- was long ago revealed as false.” [57] As Matthew Rothschild notes, Clinton “has been steadily repositioning herself on the far rightward reaches of the Democratic Party when it comes to the Pentagon.” [58] Indeed, Clinton rejects a troop withdrawal deadline calling such an action “a green light to the terrorists.” Instead Clinton has called for an enlargement of the Army by 80,000 troops to “respond to threats wherever danger lies.” [59] The above position provides little comfort that a Hillary Clinton presidency would be anything but old wine in new bottles. Lastly, we might examine the position of Barack Obama, much touted as a future leader who will steer the party on a more progressive course. [60] As Alexander Cockburn observes, Obama has been particularly adroit at projecting a progressive image while simultaneously reassuring the Democratic Party establishment that he is a “safe’” candidate. [61] Thus Obama was careful to distance himself from the statements of Rep. Jack Murtha on the necessity of immediate withdrawal from Iraq, stating instead that he favours a ‘reduction’ of U.S. forces while allowing Iraqi factions to defeat the insurgency, a position remarkably similar to that of the Bush administration. [62] Indeed, asked about his stance on foreign policy after the Democratic National Convention, Obama stated that “there’s not much difference between my position and George Bush’s position at this stage. The difference, in my mind, is who’s in a position to execute.” [63] From the above, one might wonder what really would change if a Democrat was put in the White House. While the principles of unilateralism, rejection of international law and the assault on civil liberties seem equally at home with the Democrats as with the Republicans, there is one crucial device that Democrats have employed in their execution of U.S. foreign policy objectives that maintains the appearance of difference between the two parties. Speaking on the similarities between Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair, Guardian columnist Hywel Williams noted the “convenient myth that liberals are the peacemakers and conservatives the warmongers.” However Williams warned that “the imperialism of the liberal may be more dangerous because of its open-ended nature – its conviction that it represents a superior form of life.” [64] Indeed if the Democrats differ in any respect from the Republicans in their execution of U.S. foreign policy goals, it is in the ability to cloak U.S. intervention in the guise of high-minded principles. This, coupled with the reticence to put U.S. troops in harms way, has allowed Democratic foreign policy to appear more benign and less aggressive in comparison to the Bush administration. John Pilger, writing on the Clinton administration, observes that: Covered in euphemisms such as ‘democracy-building’ and ‘peacekeeping,’ ‘humanitarian intervention and ‘liberal intervention,’ the Clintonites can boast a far more successful imperial record than Bush’s neo-cons, largely because Washington granted the Europeans a ceremonial role and because NATO was onside. In a league table of death and destruction, Clinton beats Bush hands down. [65] Indeed, Pilger argues that what the Democratic Party elite truly object to is not the aggressive use of military power, but the crude honesty of the Bush administration in its exercise: In stating its plans openly, and not from behind the usual veil or in the usual specious code of imperial liberalism and its moral authority. And that: New Democrats of Kerry’s sort are all for the American Empire; understandably, they would prefer that those words remain unsaid. [66] Thus Madeline Albright notes that all U.S. administrations have a position much like the Bush doctrine in their back pocket, but it is simply “foolish to smash people in the face with it and to implement it in a manner that will infuriate even allies. A little tact is useful.” [67] In this respect we might liken the difference between Democrat and Republican foreign policy to Labor/Likud in Israel. Speaking on the building of illegal settlements in Palestine, Chomsky writes: Labor "builds quietly," with the full protection of the Prime Minister, not ostentatiously like the rival Likud coalition. The Prime Minister can be Rabin, Peres, Barak (who broke all records in construction) or anyone else, but "we build quietly": that's the crucial phrase. And that is the reason why the US always prefers Labor to Likud. Labor does it quietly. They're the "doves." Likud tends to be arrogant and noisy about it, and that makes it harder to pretend that we don't know what we're actually doing. So Labor's always preferable. [68] Like Likud and Labor, the two American parties pursue the same goal; however one remains more adept at clothing these actions in acceptable garb. Further contributing to the optics of a more benign Democratic foreign policy, particularly to the American public, was the reticence of the Clinton administration to put “boots on the ground.” The Clinton administration, stung by the deaths of American soldiers in Somalia, viewed ground combat as risky and uncertain, especially in urban settings. Thus in Kosovo and thereafter, the U.S. was unwilling to “countenance the loss of a single American soldier.” Given this necessity, the United States opted for massive airpower, using unmanned cruise missiles and high altitude aerial bombardment in order “to wage war in ways that deprived the enemy of any real opportunity to shoot back. The role assigned to military forces in Allied Force was not to fight battles but to deliver ordinance.” [69] The use of airpower, while minimizing the potential for American casualties, has the further advantage of sanitizing the effects of war. As numerous media commentators have argued, military-managed images of surgical strikes and smart bombs have the peculiar tendency to negate the very real and devastating human effects of air campaigns. [70] Media coverage of aerial bombardment is apt to render its victims invisible, thus the use of airpower can effectively project U.S. military might while concealing the uncomfortable consequences from the American public. [71] Indeed domestic considerations on the use of military power have been a key concern of U.S. administrations due to the so-called “Vietnam Syndrome,” a “disease” that has curbed the American population’s appetite for imperial aggression since the wars in Southeast Asia. [72] While the syndrome has been declared “cured” numerous times (Grenada, Panama, Desert Storm), the fear that domestic political support would not long suffer U.S. casualties remained very real up until the current administration. If anything has changed this perception amongst U.S. planners it is the events of 9/11. As Gilbert Achcar argues, the attacks against the U.S: Created such a huge political trauma in the United States that the Bush administration thought it was possible at last, for the first time, to break once and for all with the ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ and return to the unbridled military interventionism of the first Cold War decades. [73] In the eyes of the Bush administration, the events of 9/11 expanded the parameters for possible U.S. military action to include the use of ground troops, so sure were they that the anger and hatred (duly stoked) of the domestic population would allow the sacrifice of American men and women to a degree previously deemed politically impossible. That the Bush administration proved to be overly optimistic as to the extent that the domestic population would accept U.S. losses in the ‘War on Terror’ is now all too evident. However we should not view the shift from the penchant of the Clinton era for military projection by ‘remote decision’ to Bush’s ‘boots-on-the-ground’ as entailing a fundamental alteration in the goals of U.S. foreign policy. Rather the Bush administration’s exercise of military power should be seen as a response to the changing geo-political realities post-9-11. This is demonstrated by the fact that pre-9/11, the Bush administration’s policy stance toward Iraq mimicked that of the Clinton White House. Election rhetoric notwithstanding, the newly appointed Bush team adopted the same policy of containment – including sanctions and enforcement of no-fly zones – as that of the previous White House occupant. This was despite, what we now know, calls by senior Bush advisers to ‘remove’ Saddam Hussein during the early days of the administration. [74] Even veteran neo-con hawk Paul Wolfowitz confessed during his Senate confirmation hearing that if there was any feasible way to remove Saddam from power. “I haven’t seen it yet.” [75] If the Bush administration is the aberration it has been made out to be, why the caution? It appears that the administration was constrained by the same political realities as Clinton, and therefore not as reckless as has been characterized. It was only with the September 11th attacks that the “calculations defining tolerable risk” in instigating aggressive military action “changed considerably.” [76] We might ponder what a Democratic administration might do given the same opportunity to finally flex the full muscle of the American military without constraints. Given the evidence above, are we so sure their path would have differed fundamentally from that of the Bush administration? Indeed the Clinton administration was just as eager to remove Saddam from power. While never able to contemplate outright invasion, the Clinton White House embarked on a long-term plan to weaken the regime and erode its popular base of support in order to facilitate ‘regime-change.’ As Takis Fotopoulos observes this was the rationale for the constant bombardment of Iraqi infrastructure and the crippling sanctions regime. Indeed this intent was explicitly stated in the passage of the “Iraqi Liberation Act” under Clinton that authorized $97 million in aid for Iraqi opposition forces “groomed by the American elite for governing the ‘post-Saddam’ Iraq.” [77] However it is important to note that this strategy of “containment,” followed by both Clinton and Bush Jr., was beginning to unravel in the years prior to September 11th. McCormick argues that by 1998, the containment of Iraq had reached a point of “diminishing returns.” [78] Saddam Hussein had not been ousted and if anything, the sanctions appeared to be solidifying his control on power. Furthermore, the international consensus on the desirability of the sanctions was beginning to fray as the brutal human consequences of the sanctions regime began to reach public consciousness. [79] Attendant to this, French President Jacques Chirac urged a "fundamental review" of relations between Baghdad and the UN, calling for a "new organization and a new method" to vet Iraq's weapons programs, a review of the UN embargo on Iraqi oil sales, and an improvement in living conditions for the Iraqi public. [80] Calls from the Vatican, the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) and the UN General Assembly to lift the sanctions further isolated the U.S. position on maintaining the embargo. [81] This unraveling of the international consensus to maintain the sanctions regime must be viewed within the wider context of U.S. imperial objectives in order to comprehend the pressure on the U.S. to force a resolution conducive to its own interests. As McCormick suggests, U.S. military power projection in the Persian Gulf served to “strengthen and perpetuate Europe’s dependence on American protection of its crucial oil access to the region.” [82] In this regard we should heed Michael Klare’s insight that we have to think of oil not just as a source of fuel, but as a “source of power.” According to Klare, “as U.S. strategists see it, whoever controls Persian Gulf oil controls the world’s economy and therefore, has the ultimate lever over all competing powers.” [83] Thus the containment strategy of Iraq served to notify the world who could secure access to Middle East oil. In this respect, the containment strategy was as much directed at Russia, China, and Western Europe as it was to Iraq. However as was mentioned, the fragile international consensus on the desirability of the sanctions was beginning to unravel in the late 1990s. As Achcar observes, Baghdad had granted major oil concessions to France and Russia, whose implementation required the lifting of the sanctions regime. [84] Were the embargo to be ended, the United States would have been effectively shut out not only from control over the massive oil resources in Iraq, but also the huge investment opportunities to rebuild a country devastated by twenty years of war and embargo. According to Achcar, “it was out of the question for Washington, backed by London for identical reasons, to hand it all on a silver platter to Paris and Moscow.” [85] These realities would have been equally as salient for a Democratic president as they were for the incoming Bush administration. Ostensibly the United States had two options facing it – either maintaining the embargo or securing U.S. control of Iraq. While the first option became increasingly untenable, the second required another condition to be fulfilled: “it had to be politically possible, essentially in terms of U.S. domestic politics, to invade Iraq and keep the country under direct U.S. occupation and tutelage.” [86] As has been established, the Clinton administration was not in a position to have this condition fulfilled, and was therefore restricted to strategic bombing and economic strangulation in its attempt to secure U.S. interests. However given the trajectory of Democratic foreign policy outlined above, were the suitable pre-text provided, can we be so sure that a Democratic administration would not have seized upon the events of September 11th to assure its vital interests in the Gulf? While such thoughts are obviously pure speculation, they nevertheless get to the crux of the matter of how much the two dominant political parties actually do differ in their approach to foreign policy. This paper has tried to question the conventional wisdom that the two parties are fundamentally at odds over these questions. While there are superficial differences in regards to tactics, the imperatives of U.S. imperialism will force both leaderships to attempt to secure U.S. economic objectives irrespective of which party holds power. While it is impossible to guess how a Democratic administration would have reacted to the events of 9/11, the evidence above should lead us to the conclusion that if it differed, it would be in the cursory realm of tactics, not in fundamentals. The problem is that the belligerent actions of the Bush administration have – in the eyes of liberals – thrown into stark relief the supposed benign intent of Democratic foreign policy versus that of Republican foreign policy. This is a dangerous illusion, not only because the Democrats have championed equally militaristic policies, but because it relegates change to the arena of the ballot box rather than question the underlying imperatives of the American politico-economic system. Change in the former will only bring a different manager to the latter. This paper has sought to prove that the Democratic leadership is as equally wedded to the imperatives of American imperialism as the Republicans. Too many times the rhetoric of “change of course” has been used to excuse the U.S. government of high imperial crimes, as if the history of U.S. interventionism in foreign countries could be chalked up to presidential eccentricities. It’s time liberals in the U.S. recognize that the problem is not flawed personalities but flawed economic systems. Until liberal Democrats recognize this, they will continue to be surprised by the actions of their leaders. The author would like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Isabel MacDonald for her insights and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Simon Enoch, Communication and Culture, Ryerson University, Toronto. senoch@ryerson.ca.
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