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The Meaning behind the Image:
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By Jon Bailes |
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"Actual political action that aims to change social conditions cannot be eradicated through incorporation – it can merely be made less visible. The question of authenticity is not the issue; instead it is a question of political motivation."
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Introduction This thesis examines the possible meanings and rebellious potential of spectacular subcultural youth styles in contemporary Western capitalist states. Such styles were taken as an important area of sociological research in the 1970s because they were considered to be symbolic representations of resistance against a ‘dominant’ culture that appears to make actual resistance largely impossible. This approach is typified by much of the work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham University (CCCS), where style groups such as ‘punks’, ‘mods’ and ‘skinheads’ were theorised as having specific ‘meanings’ based on class and social structure. Since then, in various critiques from other theorists, there have been many more possible meanings put forward that contradict this view – as will be shown, it is even plausible to say that subcultures are conformist and offer a false sense of rebellion. The question arises as to whether one should even try to apply overall meaning to subcultures if the possibilities are so varied and convoluted. This seems especially pertinent when considering certain postmodern theory, such as that of Jean Baudrillard, where meaning has become impossible to decipher from image, as it appears that any results would be contingent. The question then is: once it is accepted that subculture is not simply a case of class antagonisms and their symbolic expression, is it possible to ascribe any subversive, or even revolutionary, meaning to subcultural activity? The hypothesis is that, whilst society has seen a fragmentation of style and identity across class boundaries, social power structures still exist and the extent of social flexibility remains contingent on capitalist imperatives. Furthermore, the meanings behind images are still identifiable if ‘re-historicised’ according to specific context – a cross-referencing of social structure, ideology and individual motivation. And, whilst spectacular style is no longer identifiably rebellious in itself, this does not necessarily indicate there is no desire for social change. The object here then will be to steer a path between ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ approaches in theory, engaging critically with both, and trying to formulate a kind of revised revolutionary political project (along the lines of ‘neo-Marxist’ theorist, Herbert Marcuse), nowadays often completely disregarded, even by the Left. The thesis will be divided into five sections. Firstly, it will examine some of the terms that form the basis of so-called ‘CCCS’ subculture studies – ‘appropriation’, ‘incorporation’ and ‘authenticity’ – to show how they are based too rigidly on unsustainable binary oppositions. This approach is represented here primarily by the work of Dick Hebdige – framed by the ‘myth’ theory of Roland Barthes – and contributions from John Clarke, Stuart Hall, Tony Jefferson and Brian Roberts in the seminal CCCS collection, Resistance through Rituals. Also relevant here is the work of John Fiske, which celebrates creative consumerism as progressive rebellion. These approaches posit the idea of rebellion in ‘authentic’ subcultural acts, and the conflicting relationship between resistant styles and culture industries. The work of Sarah Thornton, in particular, provides a good response that shows how the relationship between subcultures and the ‘mainstream’ is a complex and contradictory one. Second, having established these complexities, it is necessary to examine what they imply for subcultural ‘meaning’. The postmodernism theory of Jean Baudrillard provides a basis here, along with that of Fredric Jameson, who both argue, with different results, that meaning is lost altogether in an endless play of aesthetically different but equivalently valued images. For Jameson however, contrary to Baudrillard, there is still hope that the meanings and histories of images remain identifiable. This section also looks at the media in the context of postmodernism theory, in order to illustrate how ideas such as equality of difference and dissipation of power do not stand up to investigation in an industry that maintains social hierarchy. The third section outlines a theory of ideology that is essential to the understanding of subculture. It incorporates arguments by Thomas Frank which claim that the Cultural Revolution of 1960s’ America was, in many ways, in line with developments in capitalism, and that corporations themselves began marketing consumer ‘rebellion’. This also introduces Jameson’s important theory that the supposed fluidity of postmodern society is based on, and restricted by, the structures of late capitalism. Therefore, the ideas of subcultural style as rebellion may be interpreted according to the new dominant ideology of more flexible and pervasive consumerism, which can, it is posited here, be extrapolated further to theorise that the current culture of self-determined identity through image manipulation is mostly an ideological construct. Finally, it will be shown that, by largely ignoring this, much recent theory has accepted this ideology on its own terms. Having explored the relationship between rebellion and conformity, the fourth section looks at the possible role of social structure in determining subcultural motivation. It will be argued that, although the ‘CCCS approach’ conflated class and symbolic resistance too readily, their contention of social structure as a locus of meaning is still valid. The work of David Muggleton, who espouses the value of testimony from subcultural members over Marxist social theory, works as a useful contrast. What becomes apparent here is that a combination of personal and social motivation is necessary to understand subculture. Finally, with criteria of analysis for subculture and at least the possibility of resistance identified, the question then becomes whether this can actually achieve any political impact. A summary of the preceding argument leads to the conclusion that as symbolic resistance this is very unlikely, and therefore it is necessary for subcultures to become actively political and collectively organised in order to create genuine resistance. To this end, a few preliminary considerations are suggested. 1. Appropriation, Incorporation and Authenticity This section examines some foundational concepts of subculture theory, namely ‘appropriation’, ‘incorporation’ and ‘authenticity’, and challenges some of their assumptions. In these concepts subcultural styles are not thought of simply as images, but as ways of consuming commodities in new and original ways that make a deliberate statement of identity; one that is born, perhaps unconsciously, of actual social conditions. First, appropriation is the process whereby, because in contemporary society ‘there is no “authentic” folk culture to provide an alternative’ to consumerism, people use commodities in personally relevant, un-prescribed ways. [1] Appropriation is a subversion of meanings – all commodities have ingrained connotations that are historically determined through particular uses by particular groups of people, and, because these meanings are always historical, nothing is fixed and new meanings can replace or exist alongside those already present. For Hebdige, this contradiction of commodity meanings has a specific purpose. Using the concept of ‘homology’ he explains how each element of a style, even if seemingly random, is deliberately appropriated towards a single signification. [2] In this analysis, the subculture directly opposes meanings that are so firmly ensconced in a culture that they appear natural, and, therefore, serve to solidify society according to a particular interpretation. It is essential to oppositional style then that ‘the objects [..] used [..] must also carry meanings organised into a system coherent enough for their relocation and transformation to be understood as a transformation’. [3] In such cases, the act of creating a subcultural style is rebellious insofar as it unveils the conventionality of meanings otherwise taken for granted as universal truths. Incorporation (or co-optation) is the term used to define the likely reaction to appropriation from commercial industries. Subcultures may be treated as a social threat to begin with, only to reach a point of normalisation where their ethos of subversion and their style becomes the latest fashion, ‘incorporated’ back into dominant culture. After this, the appropriated commodities can be bought everywhere, now pre-packaged with their new meanings already supplied, so that the transformed meaning becomes another imposed ‘natural’ meaning. This is comparable to the process of ‘mythification’ defined by Barthes. The appropriated commodity ‘contain[s] a whole system of values’, which for Hebdige and colleagues means the history of the style’s development according to specific social antagonisms. However, whilst incorporation ‘does not suppress the meaning, it [..] impoverishes it, it puts it at a distance’, [4] which means, in the context of subcultural style, the signification of ‘subversion’ remains intact to appeal to those looking for edgy new styles, but the history – the ‘why’ and ‘against what’ – of subversion is emptied out; the style becomes a gesture without critical impact. From a commercially motivated perspective the aim is to flatten the meaning out into a simple signification to appeal as widely as possible. The result is that whilst, ‘from the standpoint of the subculture which generated it, the style exists as a total life-style, via the commercial nexus, it is transformed into a novel consumption style’. [5] Even overt political meaning is no obstacle for incorporation – whether treated positively or negatively subcultures are reduced to frozen, depthless images relating to a single, de-historicised concept. As John Hutnyk explains, it is not even necessary to incorporate an entire subculture – ‘a favourite trick co-opts a few high profile names to foster the illusion that everyone else is ok’ [6] – the whole scene is branded with the de-historicised meaning and any politics fade from view. Alternatively, there is a negative incorporation that appears in the form of ‘moral panic’ in tabloid media. Rather than what this purports to be, which is a warning of a genuine threat to society, it is a misguided cry from traditionalism amplified for the purposes of entertainment and propaganda into pure spectacle. Either way, the subculture becomes a mere image, used to signify a specific concept for commercial purposes. It is crucial to conclude then that, whilst new meanings are generated, multiplying the possible meanings of an object dependent on context, these meanings are themselves mythified again when they gain public attention. Because the subversions that occur through appropriation are apparently symbolic expressions of social conditions, they fail to re-historicise the conventionalities they reveal, and leave themselves open to incorporation. Such subcultural style ‘may help to tear the ideological veil but leaves intact the structure behind the veil’, [7] whereas explicitly political subculture is marginalised. On the other hand, Fiske sees all incorporation as a defensive strategy on the part of corporate power – ‘incorporation always involves giving up some ground, the concession of space’. [8] Here, appropriation and incorporation are a form of combat – since people cannot be expected to be radical with popular culture, ‘making do’ with subversive consumerism is a form of opposition in itself. Consequently, not only is an act such as tearing one’s own jeans a way of refusing commodification and pre-packaged consumer culture, it is an example of ‘guerrilla tactics’, which ‘involve spotting the weak points in the forces of the powerful and raiding them as guerrilla fighters constantly harry and attack an invading army’. [9] However, such an analogy is surely misleading, as real guerrilla tactics are very much radical attacks on a system organised towards an eventual goal, even if that goal appears unattainable, and carry the risk of real losses. It cannot realistically be claimed that there is any organised goal amongst appropriating consumers acting as individuals for individual interests. Fiske finds a range of examples, from shoplifting youths to professional women browsing without buying in clothes shops, but fails to distinguish between different motivations, and ignores the possibility that some of these practices would actually be advantageous to the establishments in question (shops lose nothing from browsing and may even generate extra sales) – there is little evidence to suggest any ‘tactical’ attempt to exploit ‘weak points’ in the system. Also, from a corporate perspective, this theory ignores the simply commercial logic of incorporation – attempting to profit from the latest in popular culture, rather than being consciously combative. With both these theories of appropriation and incorporation comes the concept of ‘authenticity’ in subculture – those who actively appropriate objects and invent styles are resisting in a way that those who adopt ‘ready made’ styles after incorporation are not – a concept maintained by many subculture members themselves. However, whilst this may seem relevant, in reality there is no guarantee that style pioneers will be particularly dedicated to an ethos or, conversely, that latecomers will simply view it as a novelty fashion. This concept is based on the problematic assumption that ‘authentic’ subculture is always an expression of social antagonisms and opposition to dominant culture. It is further compounded when, as Angela McRobbie says, people are analytically categorised purely according to their membership of a subculture, because committed subculture members may actually fit in perfectly well at work, in family life and other areas of ‘mainstream’ society. [10] Theorists, such as Fiske, who concentrate solely on leisure pursuits fail to fully examine subculture members’ values and intentions. Furthermore, whilst the role of mass media in subculture manifests itself as de-politicising incorporation, since incorporated products may themselves be ‘re-appropriated’ subcultures may actually take on greater political meanings than they began with. All subcultures have a more complex relationship with the media than the basic model of appropriation and incorporation allows, and, as Thornton explains, a movement may only become politically relevant after it is categorised by the media. So, for example, ‘without tabloid intervention, it is hard to imagine a British youth movement. For, in turning youth into news, the tabloids both frame subcultures as major events and also disseminate them’. [11] Certainly, authenticity is not definable by an imaginary division ‘before’ and ‘after’ incorporation. Perhaps even more conclusively, this suggests a distinction between ‘alternative’ and ‘oppositional’ practices: ‘alternative culture seeks a place to coexist within the existing hegemony, whereas oppositional culture aims to replace it’. [12] But if this itself is seen as the measure of authenticity then it would render some whole subcultures inauthentic, which defeats the purpose of the exercise. Furthermore, some subcultures define themselves from the outset in terms of likely media reactions, even though they oppose themselves to so-called ‘mainstream’ culture. According to Thornton, some recent subcultures have an entrepreneurial element from the beginning and actively seek ‘moral panic’ simply as a marketing ploy. A negative media response is sought because it confers on the subculture an air of ‘hip’ rebellion without it necessarily being a reaction to specific social inequalities, even unconsciously. Also, the idea of ‘mainstream’ culture, seen as a homogeneous mass of mindless consumerism, is questionable. As Thornton explains, ‘although most clubbers and ravers characterize their own crowd as mixed or difficult to classify, they are generally happy to identify a homogeneous crowd to which they don’t belong’. [13] However, when properly analysed, ‘the characteristics of the mainstream they repeatedly disparage and subordinate [..] are those of a feminine working-class minority’. [14] Subculture members who view the ‘mainstream’ as opposition are likely to view their own group behaviour as an affinity of likeminded individuals, whereas if one disregards the ‘mainstream’ ideology one could view them as conformists – ‘inauthentic’ because simply following a style with no particular commitment. Perhaps the biggest problem with identifying ‘authentic’ subculture, however, is that subcultures do not exist as such until they are identified and categorised by mass media or cultural theorists. This creates a paradox whereby it is impossible to identify how subcultures exist ‘authentically’ without outside intervention, because the point of identification is an intervention in itself which destroys the only thing that can be authentic – an uncategorised ‘organic’ movement. Meanwhile, those subculture members who, after intervention, try to cling on to a pre-incorporated authentic subculture only cling on to a frozen image of the past taken from its historical context. This is, according to Baudrillard, ‘nothing but a supplementary subterfuge, acting as if nothing had happened and indulging in retrospective hallucination’ [15] – the supposedly authentic actually becomes the inauthentic, as it de-historicises and hides the impact of outside intervention. However, although the idea of authenticity seems redundant, it is necessary to keep in mind that cultural movements may still be born of, and retain, political ideals. For example, the incorporated image of Che Guevara on advertising posters and t-shirts may de-historicise his actions into an empty concept of rebellion, but it does not change his actual revolutionary aims. As Theodore Roszak puts it, ‘we would be surrendering to admass an absolutely destructive potential if we were to take the tack that whatever it touches is automatically debased or perhaps has no reality at all’. [16] For Barthes too there is a way of speaking that ‘remains political’ – that is ‘wherever man speaks in order to transform reality and no longer to preserve it as an image’. [17] Actual political action that aims to change social conditions cannot be eradicated through incorporation – it can merely be made less visible. The question of authenticity is not the issue; instead it is a question of political motivation. In conclusion, whilst there is such a process as incorporation, whereby appropriated meanings expressed through subcultural style are de-historicised and removed from their specific social conditions, one cannot assume that all subcultures are oppositional to begin with. There is a danger that, in theorising homological meanings for subcultural styles, categorised subcultures are being constructed rather than analysed. However, it is also going too far to suggest that ‘subcultures are best defined as social groups that have been labelled as such’, [18] as this rules out in advance the possibility that groups can come together based on similar views and experience of similar social conditions without prior media complicity, and ‘we simply end up with a symbolic interactionist version of labelling theory that is void of sensitivity to social and historical context’. [19] What becomes clear then is the need to examine subcultural behaviour in terms of individual context and a variety of possible motivations. 2. Postmodernism and the Media Once the binary oppositions between subculture and culture and the authentic and inauthentic have been exposed as problematic, the issue of a basis for subcultural meaning re-emerges. Theories of postmodernism, with their particular focus on image, are an important consideration here and question whether such meaning exists at all. Jameson defines the features of postmodernism theory as ‘a new depthlessness [..] a whole new culture of the image [and] a consequent weakening of historicity’. [20] If one follows Barthes’ myth theory to a logical conclusion it suggests a constant cycle of appropriation and incorporation, a society in which every object gains a multiplicity of seemingly natural meanings, each one divorced from its own origins. It is on this basis that Baudrillard can claim ‘it is all of metaphysics that is lost’ in a world where all meaning is de-historicised and exists merely to obscure the fact that there is no real meaning. [21] Constant appropriation means there is nothing new or unique created, just a continual rehashing and pastiche, not parody, of old styles, because there is no longer a norm to negate. However, whilst it is surely the case that significations change and multiply, it is misleading to imply that the plurality of meanings in postmodern objects are not still tied to specific contexts, and therefore a social structure. As Terry Eagleton says, ‘the old regime was never as unified as [often claimed] nor the new one as fragmented. There are still some powerful collective norms at work in it’. [22] Parody of stylistic norms must be possible, if more contextualised, otherwise nobody would ever recognise subcultural style as subcultural. And surely politicised culture can oppose a norm of de-politicised culture. For Barthes, ‘depthlessness’ was a sign of myth – ‘it abolishes the complexity of human acts [..], it organizes a world which is without contradictions because it is without depth’. [23] But this was the appearance of depthlessness, the myth that the mythologist was supposed to uncover, something which theories about actual loss of depth seem to have forgotten. In Baudrillard’s model of post-modernity it is impossible to make any kind of real social transformation – there is no particular power to resist and every alternative is supposedly equalised into a mass of relative opinion. For subculture, where one cannot assume social inequalities as a root cause, styles lose their political meaning. For example, the punks apparently appropriated the Nazi swastika without concern for its political meaning, and, although it is doubtful that this really was unmotivated – presumably this particular sign was appropriated for shock value – the symbol may be adopted later merely as an image of fashionable ‘punk style’. This is where meaning becomes indecipherable for Baudrillard, for if the only way to tell the sick from the healthy (or political statement from fashion statement) is through the symptoms (image) of an illness, and if any symptom can be ‘produced’ psychosomatically, then it becomes impossible to tell the ‘real’ illness from the ‘false’ one. [24] However, this ignores that, whilst the cultural image may appear to have the same problem, it always has context or history. Baudrillard’s medical analogy does not successfully translate to the field of the social, where there is intention to analyse as well as image. To grasp the extent to which society may be ‘postmodern’ and to understand how much impact this has on subculture theory, it is worth analysing the contemporary mass media or ‘culture industry’. For Fiske, the idea of mass culture, where the audience simply absorbs cultural products indiscriminately, as suggested by much of the culture industry theory of Theodor Adorno, is incorrect – cultural products must resonate with actual life experiences and will be accepted or rejected according to different terms of different audiences. For Barthes too, ‘some myths ripen better in some social strata’, [25] and one cannot assume that because something is incorporated its new meaning will necessarily catch on. Furthermore, rather than assume that all receptions are simply relative, Fiske posits that varying receptions carry political meanings based on power relations between broadcaster and receiver. Whilst these observations are reasonable, Fiske overstates the case by claiming that ‘at the point of sale the commodity [is] detached from the strategies of capitalism [and becomes] a resource for the culture of everyday life’, [26] suggesting that commodities come to their audience completely free of possible influence on reception. In reality, of course, commodities are not simply offered up without prescriptions for reception – the media contains a huge network of publicity and inter-referencing, discussions about how products should be received and life-style programmes demonstrating their use. However, Fiske dismisses advertising as ineffectual, interpreting ‘the ubiquity of advertising and the amount of resources it requires [as] evidence of how far social differences exceed the diversity required by the economic system’, [27] excluding the possibility that the ubiquity and size of the advertising industry may equally be testament to its success. Besides, even when people consume media whilst understanding and disregarding its intended meanings, it is necessary to take into account what McRobbie calls ‘the deep absorption of subordinate self-images’, meaning ‘that even when these [goals] are recognized and understood as oppressive they continue to exert a strong and powerful influence’. [28] One can certainly criticise the culture industry theory of Adorno, who claims that ‘the culture industry misuses its concern for the masses in order to duplicate, reinforce and strengthen their mentality’, [29] as overly critical of the public as singular, mindless culture sponges, but it is a mistake to dismiss this theory as entirely wrong just because it is not entirely right. Indeed, as Raymond Williams puts it, whilst culture as mass deception theory may fail to recognise that ‘the body of intellectual and imaginative work which each generation receives as its [..] culture is always [..] something more than the product of a single class’, it is important to also remember ‘that a dominant class can to a large extent control the transmission and distribution of the whole common inheritance’, [30] and that this will exert influence. Also, it is often overlooked that the relationship between the intention and reception of commodities must take into account how consumer desires have previously been shaped. Hebdige explains that ‘the media play a crucial role in defining our experience for us. They provide us with the most available categories for classifying out the social world’. [31] For example, one might note that subcultures place great importance on style and fashion and that this ethos coincides with the importance placed on image in mass media. Where Fiske claims that ‘the meanings I make from a text are pleasurable when I feel that they are my meanings and that they relate to my everyday life’, [32] questions arise about what exactly one’s ‘own meanings’ are and how they can be distinguished from already ingrained influence. For Baudrillard, it is impossible to decipher meaning by searching for the root cause of facts; it is instead a circular process in which facts are created at the intersection of ‘models’. These models are ways of behaving and reacting to phenomena that ‘are already inscribed in the decoding and orchestration rituals of the media’. [33] The media no longer ‘mediates’ between official discourse and lived experience, instead one-dimensional media models based on analysis of actual social groups in turn influence these groups which then influence further media analysis, and such models cannot therefore be defined because everyone is always already constructed by them. Even the political activist in postmodern society is then simply behaving according to an activist model – the real is now the de-historicised image of a real that never existed, just as the categorised subculture is a de-historicised image of a subculture that never existed. Whereas in the past the cultural dupe and the socially aware subject may have been opposed, now they are both simply playing out their media defined roles – ‘the social is a script, whose bewildered audience we are’. [34] However, things cannot be as bad as Baudrillard claims. On one hand, nothing would be wrong with these models if they covered every possible worldview, as they would be so diverse as to not noticeably be models at all. Therefore, on the other hand, if there is anything negative about them, if they deny the real, it must be by in some way restricting certain viewpoints. This indicates that the media, even in its postmodern plurality, still denies certain voices access, which in turn suggests a set of criteria for denial – or political agenda – and, therefore, the possibility of identifying viewpoints outside of prescribed models that negate that agenda. With this established, one can try to identify omissions in the supposed equivalence and plurality of media output. McRobbie claims that there is positive media diversity, as, apparently, ‘the Third World refuses now to be reassuringly out of sight of “us”, in the West. It is as adept at using the global media as the colonialist powers’. [35] Indeed, reactionary views can now be criticised and debated due to a range of pressure groups committed to challenging biased representations. But to what extent are voices actually heard if flattened out into equivalence as leisure and entertainment? Hutnyk, in his examination of radical political music, points out that artists require exposure through mass media channels and yet, in the process, lose control over the context in which their music is heard. For example, ‘ADF’s tribute track to peasant insurgency in the Darjeeling foothills is beamed via satellite simultaneously to middle-class MTV-enhanced living rooms in both Calcutta and Croydon, Carlton and Cape Town’. [36] As with incorporation, the politics is lost and the music becomes an affirmation of the ‘hybridity’ of the media – that is, a celebration of representational diversity which is based purely on the visibility (image) of minority groups, not their content (politics). Furthermore, it is misleading to suggest anyway that representations and power relations in the media are well balanced, that access is universal, and that all ideas are equally represented. Certainly, those subcultures that do not have an organised media pressure group and whose members comprise mostly of the uneducated do not have a voice. But even beyond those groups not all voices are equal – politically radical music disseminated alongside purely commercial music is one thing, but it is rare indeed to witness radical arguments in ‘serious’ news and current affairs media (themselves now mostly spectacle and entertainment). For example, in times of economic downturn it is unheard of for an economic expert or journalist on a major media platform to mention the possibility of fundamental problems in capitalism, even in supposedly ‘Left leaning’ productions. It is not so much that diverse groups have gained equal control of the media then, more that certain types of diverse representation have been allowed, or ‘subcontracted’ by those who were, and remain, in control. [37] However, because some cultural representations are still ‘censored’, this means there is still hegemony or ideology to oppose – one that hides politics behind a mass of diverse, equivalent images. This is not a traditional form of control – as Williams says, ‘control by authoritarian or paternal systems’ has gone, but freedom ‘is bound by the law of the market, it is not what is allowed to be said, but what can profitably be said’. [38] Again, misrepresentation and exclusion as parts of incorporation are more a course of commercial considerations (reflecting rigid demographic and production models) than conscious prejudices. To conclude, for Baudrillard in reality there is nothing at stake any more; those involved in conflicts are simply duped into believing that something can change when, thanks to ultimate systemic deterrents, such as nuclear weapons, it never will. But, whilst these deterrents exist, and whilst media models may predispose people to certain ways of thinking and acting, it is a mistake to claim that they are determined by them completely. If Fiske’s analysis of creative consumerism shows one thing it is that interpretations of objects always exceed what has been prescribed. It may be true that ‘the very end of myths is to immobilize the world’, [39] but there is no reason to believe that this could ever be realised. Therefore, whilst postmodern theory correctly suggests more diversity, more fragmentation and a less obvious relationship between official discourse and lived experience, theories that posit the end of truth, metaphysics and social structure only serve to strengthen the status quo. As Marcuse makes clear, ‘what has become intolerable is the overwhelming unity of opposites in this world [..] the protest against these conditions must become a political weapon’. [40] For McRobbie, a postmodern approach ‘need not [..] imply a forgetfulness or abandonment of politics. What it can do is force us to reconsider the foundations of our modern thought’, [41] leading to a more diverse analysis of social views and structural influences. Following this recommendation, critical theory must use the complexity of images and signs to analyse social structure more comprehensively – because history always really happened – rather than simply giving up in the face of that complexity, allowing dominant culture to reproduce itself unchallenged. Jon Bailes is co-founding editor of State of Nature.
Endnotes |
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