 
|
|||||||
The Global War on Terror: Unfolding The Static Approach of US Foreign Policy in the Middle East |
|||||||
|
By Alex Carnes |
|||||||
|
|||||||
|
"If the United States sought only to maintain regional stability, and curb Soviet expansion, denying aid to civilians and funding both sides of the same conflict hardly seem like relevant strategic policies."
|
|||||||
|
The events of 11 September 2001 ushered in a new era of US preemptive military action aimed at securing the safety of US interests at home and abroad. The new rhetoric of the US government insured America's right to self-defense, and the World's obligation to the defense of freedom. The Global War on Terror is one main component of this new strategy. However, as the War has evolved it has become increasingly apparent that this new doctrine does not represent a shift in US foreign policy with regard to the Middle East. In fact, the US government has sustained static normative policy in the region since the end of World War II. Though the rhetoric has changed, American strategic goals, and the means used to achieve them, have not. Introduction The War on Terror was not initiated as a policy of self defense, but rather as a vehicle by which to achieve specific political goals of the United States government. [1] Though implemented as a reaction to the hijacking of four American commercial airliners, and the subsequent attacks on United States soil in September of 2001, the politics behind the "new" foreign policy agenda of the US government had been in place for decades. With regard to the Middle East, [2] the United States strategic goals are comprised of three fundamental components: the security of the lone regional nuclear power; Israel, control over the flow of Persian Gulf oil, and maintenance of regional stability to ensure the integrity of investment opportunities. The success of this three-pronged strategy ultimately depends upon the ability of US policy to sustain the American-Israeli partnership as well as neo-colonial influence and control over Persian Gulf oil. As former National Security Advisor to President Carter, and contemporary political analyst, Zbigniew Brzezinski, notes: control of oil sources helps the US government gain "critical leverage" over its industrial rivals in Europe and Asia. [3] Though the United States only receives approximately 10-15% of its oil supply from Middle East [4] sources, control of those oil fields enables the US government to exert significant influence on those states whose powerful economies do rely heavily on Persian Gulf resources. Oil from the region accounts for nearly 30% of OECD Europe's oil imports, roughly half of China's, and supplies over 80% of Japan's needs. [5] Governmental justifications for US regional dominance in the Middle East are therefore sculpted around a mold of national security, and have been so deeply engrained in American foreign policy over the past 65 years that there is little discourse on the lucidity of these claims. By shaping the national dialogue through shifting rhetoric with regard to US political and military action in the Middle East - and using international and domestic law selectively - each governing American administration of the post World War II era has played its part in the defense of US intercession in the regional politics of Middle East nations. By analyzing the rhetoric of the Truman and Carter Doctrines, the Reagan-Bush era, and pursuit of the post 9/11 "new world order" in comparison with the evolution of normative US practices in the region, it is clear that The War on Terror was implemented to become the most recent apologia for continued US foreign policy goals and the means used to achieve them. Declaring a war on terrorism gives the United States government considerable strategic latitude. Riding international support and domestic fear, the Bush administration was able to rally support for a military response not just against the organization blamed for the attacks of 9/11, but any organization which it claims espouses terrorism and all governments which apparently harbor such activity. The declaration of war was a declaration of revenge against all those who the United States chooses to label as terrorists. In order to clarify where the lines would be drawn, President Bush introduced the layout of the organization of the post 9/11 world to the international community in a speech to Congress nine days after the attacks: "Either you're with us, or you're with the terrorists". [6] This loaded statement by the American President is significant not simply for its disclosure of unprecedented levels of exclusionary exceptionalism, but for the way in which the administration effectively redefined terrorism and the legitimacy of the American government. President Bush defined terrorism as the antithesis of American values. Such a definition relegates terrorism to a conditional standing insofar as only acts which the United States government labels as existing in opposition to American interests will be deemed as terror, and therefore necessitate a response. Even in the official definition of terrorism under the US Law Code, the wording specifically exempts the US government from the possibility of executing terrorist actions. [7] However, definitions of terrorism vary both domestically and internationally, begging the question, why? The reason for diverse opinions on the definition of terrorism is a matter of national interest. In the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as a brief example, each side views the other as pursuing ongoing terrorist activity to achieve their goals. The Palestinians argue that the Israeli government is in constant violation of international law as laid out by the United Nations, and that the tactics used by the state during periods of armed conflict fall under the definition of terrorism. [8] Israel, on the other hand, does not recognize the supranational status of the UN and therefore focuses on the right to self-defense. They argue that the targeting of civilians by the armed wings of Palestinian political factions such as HAMAS represent the true definition of terrorism. The inherently ambiguous nature of its definition renders any attempt to identify and eliminate all facets of international and domestic terrorism a futile and subjective undertaking, not to mention a conceptually inconceivable policy which by its very nature serves to alienate the global community. Therefore, if fighting a global war against terrorism is implausible, the intended perversion of this concept must be understood as a political maneuver aimed at achieving a peripheral goal. Thus the rhetoric of The War on Terror falls into place at the nearest end of a long line of politically motivated misinformation by the US government aimed at achieving a mandate for political and military intervention in the Middle East. Origins of US Political Establishment in the Middle East Over 60 years ago, the State Department described the oil reserves of the Gulf as "a stupendous source of strategic power" and "one of the greatest material prizes in world history." [9] Though the strategic importance of the Middle East has been known for centuries, direct involvement in the region by the United States is a recent development. Despite having been allied with the Western Empires of Britain and France that wrestled control of the region away from the Ottoman Empire after achieving victory in World War I, the United States was not in a powerful enough position to lobby for regional influence. Having consolidated influence over the Western Hemisphere under the auspices of the Monroe Doctrine, and with anti-colonialism rhetoric filling the halls of the White House and Congress, US foreign policy in the Middle East was limited to discourse on "self-determination" [10] for Jews in Palestine and the paradoxical role of silent witness to the Sykes-Picot treaty. [11] However, when regional oil sources were discovered in the 1920s US oil companies began competing for influence against the British and French, an uphill battle which yielded poor results for the US government, gaining less than 10% of the oil reserves. One decade later massive oil reserves were discovered in Saudi Arabia that helped set the stage for US dominance in the region. Though the British were the reigning regional power, the government was indebted to the United States from World War I after having "mortgaged their empire" [12] in order to afford to fight the war. These debts were called in by the US government and the result was an exclusive concession by the Saudis for oil exploration to Aramco, a conglomerate of four US oil companies. During the Second World War the United States government was able to begin consolidating its control of Middle East oil reserves having been spared the significant economic and infrastructural damage that the European nations suffered. This distinct advantage, couple with strategic alliances created with local Arab leaders, was directly responsible for the 500% expansion of US control over regional oil resources in approximately 15 years. The vast amount of profit created during this period of growth propelled three corporations - Socal, Esso and Socony - into the ranks of the top five US companies of the time, in turn creating a significant amount of political influence. At the same time that US dominance over the oil industry was being consolidated, the Marshall Plan [13] was being put into effect to rebuild Europe and Japan, with oil replacing coal as the key source for fuel. The United States government, holding the key to oil access, thus became the guarantor of European and Japanese economic stability. Though the powers that benefited from this arrangement showed no signs of disapproval, the Middle Eastern countries that were losing domestic oil supplies and being exploited by the United States began to grow weary of US dominance. While the American government got richer off of Persian Gulf oil, they also continued to support the oppressive regimes in Saudi Arabia and British-controlled Kuwait. In 1946, Iranian oil workers fueled by nationalist sentiment went on strike, followed by similar events in Iraq. The threat of nationalistic uprisings led the US government to pursue policies of insurance regarding their interests in the Middle East. The ongoing debate on Zionism, namely the allure of the creation of a democratic and dependent state, therefore rose to the foreground as the US sought an alternative regional ally to the volatile Arab regimes. This was the beginning of United States foreign policy in the Middle East as we know it today, operating for the creation of stability over justice, and the security of control over Persian Gulf oil. US Foreign Policy under the Truman Doctrine The Truman Doctrine effectively reoriented U.S. foreign policy, away from its usual stance of withdrawal from regional conflicts not directly involving the United States, to one of possible intervention in far away conflicts. [14] The earliest direct component of US political strategy in the Middle East was the support for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Under the British mandate in the interwar years, Jewish immigration to Palestine was limited by quotas, leaving survivors of the Holocaust and Jewish immigrants in Europe stuck in camps awaiting transportation. The majority of the Jewish community sought resettlement in the United States, yet the US government did not desire the population, thus setting in motion the campaign against the British to allow unlimited Jewish settlement in Palestine. Ignoring the issue of Palestinian displacement, the US successfully won control of immigration policy when the British, under increasing pressure from the United States and violent protests in Palestine, turned over the political mandate of Palestine to the United Nations. The UN at this time was heavily influenced by the American government's ability to levy economic pressure against its member states, and before long a partition plan was set forth. In order to pass, the plan needed to gain the support of 2/3 of the UN General Assembly, a 55 member body which was not accessible to any of the global colonies and was comprised of many nations that were at the time receiving large quantities of aid from the United States. With Soviet support for the partition plan (in hopes of weakening British influence in the region), the vote required only a few wavering countries' support. After failing to pass in the first round of voting, a brief recess was granted before a second vote would be taken. As one columnist reported, "President Truman cracked down harder on his State Department than ever before to swing the United Nations vote for the partition of Palestine". [15] Not only did 26 American Senators with influence on foreign aid bills sign a telegram that was sent to wavering countries, but a rubber embargo was threatened against the Liberian government, and two top diplomats of Southeast Asian nations that spoke out against partition were recalled from their post almost immediately. [16] The coercion by the United States to achieve a goal which on the surface appeared to be in the name of justice, but was indeed a strategic move taken to gain an ally in the Middle East at the expense of the local Arab population, was the first of many transgressions against human rights by the United States government in support of its interest in the alliance with Israeli. Achieving the stability of Israel required both material and financial support, aid which was used to secure the relationship with the new nation in a mold of dependence which would render Israeli support of US policy in the region as conditional to their survival. Support for the creation of Israel was in direct contradiction to the Truman Doctrine, established months prior to the official recognition of Israel, which stated that it is "the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure". [17] Clearly the government had ignored the findings of the 1919 King-Crane Commission, a delegation sent to the region to inquire about settlement interests that expressed the self-determination desires of the Arab populations. The second major component of the Truman presidency with regard to US presence in the Middle East came in the form of the containment policy laid out by top US diplomats at the end of World War II. Under the auspices of the Truman Doctrine which called for "the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion", the US government set up a moral and ideological justification for intervention in Middle East affairs to establish a pretext for military opposition to Soviet expansion. Truman stated in his speech to Congress his belief "that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way." The concern of the US government was organized in a manner which qualified the will of free people as the utmost concern, focusing on the need for immediate US aid to countries whose citizens were at risk of falling under oppressive totalitarian regimes. The rhetoric throughout the speech focuses on the necessity of the US as the lone free superpower to assist the needy and ensure freedom worldwide, with little mention of US strategic interests. In fact, there is only one mention of US security in the speech and it is made in light of international peace. However, US foreign policy in practice seemed to subvert the principal motif of the Doctrine - opposition to coercion and protection of freedom - or at least selectively apply it when US interests were in question. Evidence for this claim lies in the examples of the US-Saudi relationship, creation of and continued support for Israel, the CIA coup staged in Iran, and a later but equally relevant set of events late in 1956 during the Eisenhower administration. Other than military aid to Israel, and support for oppressive regimes, the American government expanded their means into further illegitimate activities in order to bolster influence in the region. In 1951, the Iranian government was controlled by Mohammed Mossaddeq, a democratic nationalist who ran on the platform of nationalizing Iranian oil. Within two years the CIA ran a covert operation to overthrow the democratically elected leader and insert a pro-US leader, the Shah. The move, codenamed Operation Ajax, was originally deemed a success for its role in evading Soviet expansion into Iran. With the Cold War icing over the world, and Soviet power instigating war on the Korean Peninsula as well as crushing Eastern European revolts, Soviet power at the Iranian border was seen as an imminent threat. Arguing that any Soviet expansion into the region posed a greater threat for the future, and by citing the control of millions of Muslims in Central Asia already, the US cited the coup in Iran as a legitimate and necessary operation. However, the true motive of the move was to secure US influence over Iranian oil fields, [18] a strategic position which eventually backfired and resulted in the loss of diplomatic relations with the Iranian government through to the present day. The reason for the success of the revolution against the US backed leader was rooted in his harsh dictatorial reign, [19] a noteworthy point since the expressed objective of the Truman Doctrine was to avoid just such a government. The Hungarian uprising and the Suez crisis combined represent perhaps the most explicit example of US willingness to suspend self-proclaimed moral and ideological convictions in light of strategic interests. Though these events took place under Truman's successor, Dwight D Eisenhower, they nonetheless fall under the era dominated by the Truman Doctrine, as Eisenhower adapted it to his own administration as vital to the containment effort against the Soviet Union. In 1956, with the encouragement of Western media, anti-Communists in Hungary rebelled against Soviet influence and were summarily crushed without any help from the United States. Though the US government had no legal responsibility to help defend Hungary, the self-imposed obligation of defending free peoples from totalitarian pressure was ignored in favor of maintaining improving relations with Moscow. Similarly, when Egypt decided to nationalize control over the Suez Canal in 1956, Israeli forces joined with an Anglo-French invasion force to regain control of the strategic area, with little protest by the United States. In fact, the US did move a naval fleet to the area, but US foreign policy was so muddled at that point in time that when the Chief of Naval Operations radioed to the Commander of the 6th fleet to prepare for imminent hostilities the following exchange took place: Commander: "Am prepared for imminent hostilities, but whose side are we on?" The Truman Doctrine lays the groundwork for US foreign policy in the Middle East through the present era. Establishing a moral pretext for intervention in foreign conflicts, Truman makes declarations about the organization of the world order which will be echoed by his successors. Whether urging the world to chose between two government systems, declaring opposing empires as "evil", or drawing a line between friend and terrorist, scare tactics and selective application of stated policy became the new status quo for US foreign relations in the Middle East. Carter Doctrine The Middle East's crude, the President declared, was 'our oil', and would be defended at all costs. [21] The Carter Doctrine exists as the systematic extension of the Nixon Doctrine. In July 1969, President Nixon set forth his administration's foreign policy in a press conference in Guam. Calling for peace through alliance with America, Nixon opened up the flood gates of economic and military aid by establishing a foreign policy centered around the principle that America's allies should provide their own manpower for defense. In this era, aid was increased to Iran and Saudi Arabia to maintain stability in the region. With rising oil revenues, and increased aid from the United States, Iran quickly became one of the world's leading creditor nations, establishing bilateral investment treaties with several Western nations, on top of the already substantial share of US investment. However, military aid alone did not suffice to protect US interests as the pro-American regime in Iran was overthrown and an Islamic Republic was established in 1979. Also taking place at this time was the Soviet conquest of Afghanistan. Citing fear of Soviet expansion into the Middle East, President Carter expanded on the Nixon Doctrine calling not just for aid to US allies in the region, but also the right to oppose any external threats to stability through any means necessary. The Carter Doctrine, along with the Reagan Corollary which added defense against internal threats to stability, set the stage of US involvement in the Iran-Iraq War, or Persian Gulf I as it is referred to in the regional literature. Used as a case study, the actions and documentation that surfaced throughout Persian Gulf I reveal the static nature of US goals, and the means used to achieve them, relative to the preceding 35 years of US foreign policy. The United States government had spent many years sending weapons shipments, providing intelligence for, and aiding the Iranian government under the Shah, yet after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, and the seizure of the US embassy, relations with the Iranian government ceased to exist. For this reason, when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, support for the Iraqi government was imperative. An Iranian takeover of Iraq's oil fields would leave an unfriendly government to the United States in control of a large portion of the world's oil imports. Therefore, the United States began supplying Iraq with intelligence and weapons, as well as supplying security for their shipping industry. Furthermore, the American government allowed the sale of Saudi, Kuwaiti and Jordanian US weapons supplies to Iraq, a violation of international law. As a result of US support for Iraq, be it subtle and ambiguous, President Reagan removed Iraq from the government's list of terrorist states - a clearly political move. The degree to which this conflict was completely irrelevant to the Cold War with the Soviet Union is illustrated by the Soviets' support for Iraq. Though the US had claimed fear over Soviet Expansion in the region, the Soviets were actually playing host to Iraqi radio broadcasts, and supplying the Iraq regime despite claims of neutrality similar to the United States. To further complicate the situation, there were reports of Israeli support for Iran (separate from the Iran-Contra affair to be discussed below) and an Israeli raid against a suspected Iraqi WMD plant. [22] These seemingly paradoxical relationships were in fact no mistake. As Henry Kissinger was quoted as saying, "It's a pity both sides [Iran and Iraq] can't lose". The United States was involved in the conflict purely as a means by which to weaken the two regional super powers in a bid to strengthen the American government's role in the region. To make matters worse, just as the US government violated arms exports violations to support Israel, [23] the United States supported covert weapons sales to Iran in the mid 1980s, while still funding Iraq. The sales were originally conducted through the Israeli government with arms and supplies being transferred to Iran from Israel in return for US resupply of Israel and the subsequent payment. The deal eventually deteriorated into US executives selling arms directly to Iran for a profit which partly went to violent rebels in Nicaragua who were fighting against the democratically elected regime in that country. [24] These illegal deals came during the same time period that the US government was actively vetoing vital aid to the Iranian civilian population. If the United States sought only to maintain regional stability, and curb Soviet expansion, denying aid to civilians and funding both sides of the same conflict hardly seem like relevant strategic policies. The tactics used by the United States government in the Middle East during the Iran-Iraq war represent no shift from the means used to achieve the establishment of the Israeli state. The intentional harm done to civilian populations, illegal arms deals, and economic coercion were tactics used by the US government whether under the claim of Cold War containment policy or the need for a Jewish homeland. The shift of stated US political goals in the Middle East represented no change in normative action by the US government, nor did they affect in any way the American government's three primary aims in the region. Post Cold War US Policy in the Middle East Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. [25] Nowhere is United States policy in the Middle East more clearly revealed for its ambitions of oil control than in the government's relationship with Iraq at the end of the Cold War. With the waning power of the Soviet Union came the emergence of the United States as the world's only superpower. With that status, and the end of the Iran-Iraq War and operations in Afghanistan, the American government was lacking a legitimate justification to exercise its power in the region. Two opportunities existed for the United States to reassert itself in the Middle East: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the establishment of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process. After the Iran-Iraq war, the US government maintained a stable relationship with Saddam Hussein. In a 1990 meeting between the US ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, and Saddam Hussein, the ambassador informed Hussein that the US was aware of Iraq's growing frustration with the Kuwaiti government but stated that "we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflict, like your border disagreement with Kuwait". [26] One week later, with the threat of US intervention presumed dormant, Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US leadership exercised its political duplicity. Almost immediately, the UN Security Council, led by the United States, now the world's only remaining superpower, leveled heavy economic sanctions against the Iraqi regime. The United States also deployed its military forces to Saudi Arabia, and encouraged other nations to do the same. Through political and economic coercion, using the same influential tactics as the government used for the support for the creation of Israel, the US went even further in order to garner support for the opposition of Saddam. Though the plan was to lead the invasion of Iraq, the US government wanted to make every attempt to legitimize the invasion in the eyes of the international community. By demonizing Saddam Hussein, a recent ally, and pointing to the clear violations of international law [27] (that the US had themselves ignored in the preceding decade), the US raised enough support for its war to win a vote in the UN calling for military action against Iraq. Coming right around the same time as the official collapse of the Soviet Union, the subsequent US victory in Iraq left the American government more influential in the Middle East than at any other point in history. The proverbial green light given to the Iraqi regime echoes a similar strategy deployed by the US government in Lebanon ten years prior. With Lebanon entangled in a civil war, Israel sought to invade the nation but relied heavily upon the support of US military aid. Having recently brokered a cease-fire between Israel and the PLO, the US official position was to take a hard line against Israeli aggression to the extent of having arms trade limitations. Yet despite these restrictions, the US sent a massive shipment of arms to Israel during what would prove to be the planning stages of an Israeli invasion of Lebanon. [28] However, military intervention in the Middle East was not the sole source of US fabricated justifications for dominance in the region. After the Gulf War the US made its next step towards its long-term political goals in the region and the security of US influence: establishing the peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians. To impose peace in the Middle East between the Arab states and the Israelis while still maintaining significant power in the region, the US government proposed bilateral talks between the parties. This meant that the United Nations would not be involved in brokering international peace deals, but rather Israel would deal independently with each Arab neighbor in order to establish political relations. However, the peace talks stalled between the governments. Even the less publicized meetings between the Israelis and the Palestinians, including the PLO which was largely ignored on the international stage at that time, eventually produced no hope for possible future peace in the region. The problem resulted largely from the US political agenda to bring stability, rather than justice to the region. Rather than attempt to create political inclusion for the Palestinians, the US position on the Arab-Israeli conflict was aimed at providing as much security for the Jewish state as possible. After the failed bilateral agreements, The Madrid talks and the Oslo Accords (though not directed by the US but certainly influenced by that government's political agenda), served to produce further negative results by setting the precedent for Israeli military expansion. The Oslo Accords' original success granted the Palestinians limited autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza, but therefore granted the Israeli government an expanded mandate to tightly control the unfortified regions. The subsequent expansion of Israeli settlement and restriction on travel for Palestinians, coupled with the election of a right wing government after Rabin's assassination virtually collapsed the peace process set in motion at Oslo. The United States government had attempted to establish Israel as a main center for trade in the region, as well as earn pro-West Arab allies, and instead ended up with fragmented relationships and less credibility. Though peace was established between Jordan and Israel (making Jordan the second Arab state to recognize Israel after Egypt in the late 1970s), nothing was done about the continued violation of international law by Israel, especially its occupation of Arab lands. [29] While the peace process was taking place, sanctions on Iraq continued throughout the 1990s, further discrediting US hegemony in the region. Not until 1997 was even limited relief provided to the civilian population, this through the Oil-for-Food program established by the UN. However, the humanitarian crisis remained critical. Though having entered a new political era, one marked by global hegemonic influence and lone dominant power in the Middle East, regional policies of the US government remained stagnant. In the continued pursuit of Israeli security, regional stability, and control of oil reserves, the US government maintained its willingness to selectively apply international and domestic law. The fact that the removal of the Soviet threat did not shift US policy goals, or means to achieve them, sheds light on the static doctrine of US normative policy in the Middle East. At the turn of the millennium, one event would drastically change the face of US foreign policy, yet this doctrinal shift would be theoretical in nature, and in fact merely provided the justification for the continued pursuit of static post-World War II US policy in the Middle East. The War on Terror Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists. On the morning of 11 September 2001, nineteen lightly armed Islamic extremists stormed the cockpits of four American commercial passenger airliners with the intent to perform suicide attacks on targets of symbolic value, two of which were hit; the twin towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The attacks resulted in the death of nearly 3,000 individuals, most of whom were civilians, including an estimated 500 nationals from approximately 90 countries. President Bush responded to these attacks with calls for the defense of freedom, and for justice to be brought to the enemies of America. The President was also adamant about the global nature of the coming fight, stating that "This is not ... just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom". He even went as far as to indirectly point to the obligation of NATO countries to support the United States government in its declaration of war against its enemies, taking their participation as inevitable: Perhaps the NATO charter reflects best the attitude of the world: An attack on one is an attack on all. The civilized world is rallying to America's side ... They understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next. Terror unanswered can not only bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments. [30] It is in this speech that President Bush coined the term "War on Terror", and drew the lines between sides by stating that "Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists". By making these statements the American President defined terrorism as any act which the United States believes threatens freedom and the American way of life, adding that all those who do not oppose such actions are thereby placed in the same category as the terrorists. Yet how one defines terrorism has considerable bearing on the legitimacy of such bold attempts at unilateral global division. Defining Terrorism The Bush administration defined terrorism in a manner which places it in its own class of actions, a distinctive practice which is immoral, and therefore those who execute terrorism can, and need to be, eliminated by defenders of freedom. The opposing viewpoint is the timeless quote "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter". In this outlook, terrorism is relative. It is important to note that in both of these ideologies, a terrorist act is mutually exclusive of an act of resistance or one intended to defend freedom. In other words, intent is the only defining characteristic of a terrorist act. The positive connotation of the phrase freedom fighter, and therefore the negative connotation of the word terrorist, relies on the intended outcome of the actions rather than on the means themselves. In such a case, the freedom fighter is an inherently good force because the goal of his actions are just and morally acceptable despite the means he used to achieve them. One must understand that freedom fighters sometimes employ terrorist tactics in order to achieve their goal; in this manner there can be no distinctions between the terrorist and the freedom fighter as both have undertaken immoral actions. By definition, if one cannot distinguish between a freedom fighter and a terrorist based on the intended outcome, then one must judge every action of each side independently, thereby eliminating the possibility of any objective definition of terrorism. An added complication in fighting a war against terrorism is that terrorist acts are not always the worst kinds of actions. The majority of accepted definitions of terrorism concern harm done to a group of innocent individuals (read: civilians) in order to influence a third party for political gain. Such a definition includes the taking of hostages as terrorism but would not include a massacre of an entire ethnic group due to the lack of motive involved. Thus, terrorism is not always the greatest form of evil. Therefore, the important thing to note is that by declaring a war on terrorism, and drawing the line in the sand on such an ambiguous term, the United States government assumed the right to selectively decide who it would label as a terrorist. Such a mandate automatically legitimizes the actions of the government by self-defining all of their operations as in direct opposition to terrorism, the proclaimed objective paragon of evil. However, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 tested the limits of the administration's definition of terrorism, and its authority to spread the War on Terror beyond self defense. Iraq The Iraq war was a major test to the Bush administration's unilateral approach to the War on Terror. Though the UN resolution that the US gained support through [31] immediately after the attacks did not establish any legitimacy for military action, the American Congress had authorized military deployment against any nation or organization that had planned the September 11th attacks to prevent further atrocities. In order to procure Congressional approval for an invasion of Iraq, President Bush cited that "members of al Qa'ida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11th, 2001, are known to be in Iraq", adding also that "Iraq persists in violating resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. [32] Here again the US selective respect for international law is revealed, as ongoing violation of UN resolutions by Israel for similar activities continued to be supported by the US regime. Publically, the original call for war against Saddam Hussein was the Iraqi regime's possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction, namely chemical and biological weapons. US intelligence reports suggested Iraq still maintained stockpiles of these weapons which were used against the Kurds and against Iran in the 1980s when the US supplied military aid to Iraq. However, these claims were either proved to be false, or could not be verified. With this information viewed in light of a memo that was released detailing plans for a post-Saddam Iraq [33] (written before the September 11th attacks and therefore completely irrelevant to the new War on Terror), the justifications for the invasion seem to be few and far between. During the war itself, American use of illegal weapons, the failure to comply with the responsibilities of an occupying power, and the illegal detaining of combatants have plagued the legitimacy of the invasion. The use of white phosphorous, a gas agent intended to be used in non populated areas for the purpose of covering troop movements, was widely criticized by the international community, as was the use of weapons coated in Depleted Uranium. As an occupying power, the United States has the obligation of caring for the civilians of Iraq as long as it has a military presence in the nation. [34] This means the US government must care and provide for the innocent and protect them from such weapons as previously described. Also, the hiring of private contractors as security forces in Iraq violated a further necessity of holding violators of the law responsible for their transgressions. Controversy has arisen over such organizations as Blackwater, whose employees have been accused of several heinous acts of violence against civilians. However, these employees are neither subject to US law nor Iraqi law, and any punishment by Blackwater would be deemed as an admission to illegal action in Iraq, an apology which could cost them their contract. Also brought to question has been the number of oil contracts given to companies which had ties to the Bush administration. The war in Iraq was unilaterally initiated by the American government by means of perversion of US law. While in Iraq, the nation that invaded under the pretext of bringing justice and freedom to the Iraqi people proceeded to commit numerous human rights violations as well as confiscating Iraq's oil fields and disrupting the relative regional security of the 1990s. The actions taken by the United States against Iraq under the umbrella of its foreign policy, dominated by the War on Terror, clearly create a disconnect between the stated ambitions of the United States government and the actual goals it was pursuing in the region. Conclusion: Blowback and the OCO Reveal Ever-Stagnant Policy The War on Terror exists as the newest justification for the United States government's means of achieving its three main strategic goals in the Middle East: stable markets, control of the oil fields, and the security of Israel. Though there is a significant amount of empirical data supporting the claims of the latter two arguments, and little information in this paper with regard to the first (sustaining stable markets), one must note that the outcomes associated with Israeli security and maintaining control over the oil fields make up the majority of the argument for stable markets. US hegemonic influence leads directly to Western investment in the area, today amounting to about 90 billion US dollars. However, American policy and action in the region has created a significant amount of blowback and raised questions regarding the legitimacy of the so-called War on Terror; its motives, selective execution, and hypocritical nature have created a dichotomy between the stated goals for the defense of international freedom, and continued support of human rights violations with disregard for international law. As then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated in 2003, "Today we lack the metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day then the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?" [35] The unilateral approach to the War on Terror by the Bush administration, highlighted by Bush's prewar statement full of first person declarations regarding his unwavering resolve to defeat evil, created worldwide blowback not only against Westerners abroad but also foreign nationals such as Iraqi citizens caught in suicide bombings. As a final piece of evidence against the sincerity of the War on Terror, the blowback that has plagued the US in the region has not had any effect on the ever static foreign policy of the American government. Rather than shifting its agenda, or strategy, to remain committed to defending the innocent against "evil", the US government has sought to alter its rhetoric. From the War on Terror, to the Global War on Terror, to Obama's declaration of the "new" policy as the "Overseas Contingency Operation", the US government has shown no attempt to sincerely evaluate its Middle East policy. The reaction of policy makers and political analysts in the Arab states bear testament to the failure of US attempts to legitimize their actions. According to one political analyst at the Center for Strategic Studies in Amman, Jordan, the actions of the Western powers have left Arab leaders believing that "maybe the only solution is to turn a blind eye to Islamic terrorism if the West turns a blind eye to Israeli transgressions". [36] While the War on Terror was successful initially in creating a justification for the US means of achieving its political goals the long term effects may prove to be detrimental. One major goal of the US in the Middle East has been severely threatened as a result of the war, and this is the region's political stability. The destruction of Saddam Hussein's regime helped strengthen the Islamic state of Iran, and brought about the subsequent eruption of sectarian violence in Iraq aided by US support for various Sunni militias. Also, the unconditional support for Israeli self-defense by the US government has led to unprecedented military strikes against the increasingly repressed and therefore belligerent HAMAS political leadership in Gaza. Through the trespasses of the United States government against domestic and international law, and their direct support for nations that do the same, the tactics of the War on Terror are slowly being revealed as the continuation of 60 years of US international law violations in the Middle East. Executing their foreign policy toward unchanged goals by means of economic and political coercion, support for repressive regimes, abandonment of UN resolutions and human rights, the American government has shown no moral improvement or shift in action to denote the undertaking of a war in which an inherent and absolute "evil" is opposed by a high-valued and moral "good". By defining a moral undertaking as the relative value of its goal, and dismissing the means by which this goal is achieved, the United States government successfully used the War on Terror as a justification for the exercise of hegemonic control in the Middle East. Despite the election of the Obama administration and the dawning of a self-proclaimed new age of "hope" the US government has maintained the veil of rhetoric over its foreign policy. Guantanamo Bay remains open, the US presence in Iraq is unlimited, the war in Afghanistan has been ramped up and drone strikes continue in Pakistan and Yemen. Furthermore, the US once again failed to act in defense of freedom and stability when Israel invaded the Gaza strip in January of 2009. These latest events are perhaps the most revealing as the world watched two administrations on opposite ends of the political spectrum engage in nearly identical normative policy in the Middle East. At this point in our history the argument must evolve from disclosing the static policy of US interference in the Middle East to understanding what drives each administration toward pursuing these ends through such damaging means. Alex Carnes is a Graduate Student at Castleton State College serving as a Graduate Assistant with the football team and studying to earn an MA in Education. He earned his BA in International Studies (with a concentration in Diplomacy) from The College of New Jersey in 2009 with minors in Arabic, and Religion and Philosophy, and spent the Spring of 2008 studying at The University of Jordan in Amman.
Endnotes |
|||||||
