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Egypt, Democracy and Neoliberalism |
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By Jon Bailes |
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"In addition to the Mubarak regime's human rights record, it should not be ignored that it was its economic policy in response to IMF loan deals that triggered a huge downturn in fortunes for most Egyptians, and that these measures have been heavily praised from outside."
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Recent events in Egypt have already been historic. The uprising that began on January 25th and has so far culminated in the end of Hosni Mubarak as president, with control being temporarily handed over to the Egyptian army, is a huge advertisement for the power of protest and genuinely inspirational. US President Obama is correct to point out that Egypt's transition is only just beginning. [1] On other points though, the Egyptian people may do well not to hold Obama's soothing words in too high regard, lest they get swept up in a rhetoric of abstractions that may do little to actually change everyday life for the majority. 'Democracy', 'hunger for change' and 'moral force' are all noble in themselves, yet there are other things just as crucial that the US administration isn't really talking about - for instance, solving the issues of widespread poverty and hunger for food. But why would anyone pay attention to the leader of a government that announces its full support for Egyptian democracy having just finished, under numerous guises - Democrat and Republican - completely backing the country's oppressive dictator for nigh on thirty years? Now, apparently, because 'the Egyptians have made it clear that nothing less than genuine democracy will carry the day', the US is right behind them. What are we to infer from this - that US support of dictators is an honest mistake, because how were they to know that those people didn't really want to be oppressed after all? As usual in these situations, one should not fall into the trap of simply chiding the US government for its hypocrisy; its ability to change allegiances at the drop of a hat. Instead the task is to find the consistency in the different positions. Certainly the official position changed as events developed, yet the relationship with Mubarak was already conflicted. According to the New York Times, Wikileaks cables on Egypt 'show American officials' close ties to the government of President Hosni Mubarak, despite occasional discomfort with his autocratic rule.' [2] On one hand continued financial support and little problem with foreign or economic policy, on the other pressure on Mubarak to implement reforms in the way of 'democracy promotion' and frustration at his refusal to comply. The irony (hypocrisy) of course being that the continued financial aid from the US put the regime in a more comfortable position to resist calls for reform. [3] The quick withdrawal of US support for Mubarak himself was perhaps no surprise, therefore, and that this was followed by the backing of Mubarak's own appointed replacement, Omar Suleiman, points to a desire to continue with the same regime under a figure already earmarked as a suitable replacement by both the US and Israel. [4] Note, at this point there was no call for democracy as such. Then finally, as it became clear that this appointment, along with some minor reforms, would not disperse the crowd, the US quickly welcomed the news of authority being passed to a council of military leaders. After this, the rhetoric of democracy finally emerges. The implication of all this is clear - only if there's no other choice, and then only if there's a reliable onside force to broker the conditions. And the Egyptian military, in the end, is not a bad force to have in control - exceedingly influential and already popular [5] (and populated at ground level by ordinary citizens engaged in military service) they've also come out of the last few weeks fairly clean. Obama made sure to include the military in his February 11th assessment, specifically congratulating them for somehow refraining from the unthinkable of carrying out a massacre on crowds of tens, even hundreds, of thousands of unarmed, non-violent civilians (putting aside whether it was a viable tactic, or if the soldiers would have obeyed orders to attack). And of course the military have a lot to thank the US for themselves in helping maintain their influence in the country and plenty of incentive to continue along the same lines - $1.3 billion a year in military aid for starters, not to mention the huge sums in debt relief for siding with US military actions. [6] The US government knows full well that the military elite in Egypt is no more interested in allowing uncontrolled democratic reform than it is. So what, in the midst of all the change, is supposed to remain the same? What has been worth the sacrifice of the Egyptian people all these years and continues to be so? The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, certainly - supposedly as good a reason as any for supporting this dictatorship all this time, regardless of the consequences. But in all the talk about whether the Muslim Brotherhood would destabilise foreign relations, it is easy to forget the economic reasons for wanting things not to change too greatly; to grant minor reforms without allowing the prevailing system to be disturbed. Looking back over recent years, especially since 2006, Egypt has witnessed an increase in strikes and industrial action. The reasons given for these are mainly, if not exclusively, to do with higher pay to maintain basic living standards in the face of rising prices. [7] So, while the mass uprising that began on January 25th was to a large extent about democracy and self-determination, it is also certainly the case that increasing poverty, and the perceived impossibility of getting the incumbent regime to do anything about it, was a major factor in reaching this point. When a nation's leadership takes measures that exacerbate poverty, refuses to reverse its decisions and looks set to continue in power, in one guise or another, permanently, self-determination takes on added urgency. The important point here is that this is not only due to Hosni Mubarak, his government and fellow Egyptian elites. The full story, sadly an all too familiar one, is only revealed when one looks at the connection between Mubarak's neoliberal economic policy, the extreme poverty it created, and the dictates of 'structural adjustments' coming from the IMF. Although in fact, if you ask the IMF, the economic situation in Egypt that led to huge swathes of its population risking their lives to demand change was one of steady improvement since its programmes had been implemented. Certainly from one perspective things were improving - economic growth and dramatic increase in GDP, certainly linked to a programme of privatisation, 'free market' competition and attraction of foreign investment. And of course a minority in the country were getting very rich off the back of this economic shift. However, behind these figures is a story of ever worsening poverty for ever greater numbers of people coupled with huge rises in food costs [8] , not to mention that the economic ground does not look so stable after all - initially boosted by mass privatisation that is no longer possible, dependent on the volatile oil industry and outside investment, and facing capital flight and a trade deficit in which imports are nearly double exports. [9] All of this is, of course, perfectly in line with the structural adjustment policies the IMF has pressed on to countless nations in return for loans. In fact, a 1990 US Library of Congress Country Study on Egypt makes it clear that a 1987 agreement with the IMF 'was considered lenient by IMF standards, although not by the Egyptians', and that the Egyptian government only 'subsequently implemented many changes, including raising energy and food prices'. [10] In addition to the Mubarak regime's human rights record, it should not be ignored that it was its economic policy in response to IMF loan deals that triggered a huge downturn in fortunes for most Egyptians, and that these measures have been heavily praised from outside. The point is that lack of democracy alone is not the cause of mass uprising; it is the combination of destructive economic policy controlled from afar and the brutality required to enforce it, because nobody would accept such economic policy given the choice (and, in this case, even not given a choice, the people have now refused to accept it). As it has been repeatedly argued against the dominant political discourse, most notably by Naomi Klein in The Shock Doctrine, it is not that progressive macro-economic changes are tainted by poor local leadership, it is that these changes demand oppressive dictators to make them happen. Seen in this light the US's position on Egyptian 'democracy' becomes clearer. Whilst they may welcome some reforms to deal with the extremes of poverty, most of the attention is focused on abstractions that may allow people to feel more in control without giving them any say on the kind of economic programme that will dominate their lives. Even more cynically, the main reason for wanting to have political reforms at all may be simply to ease tensions and stop industrial action, making Egypt more attractive to foreign investors. The people of Egypt have already achieved so much. It is now up to them to make sure they get the country they deserve; making sure they remain in control of the coming process and not conceding too much for the sake of simply calling their country a democracy. This is a historical moment where the future of neoliberalism really is in the balance. Jon Bailes is co-founding editor of State of Nature.
Endnotes |
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