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Defining Terrorism: A Thought Experiment

By Dennis Chapman


"Neither hegemonic conformity nor resistance movements should target civilians; however, each should expect the material consequences of using terrorist means, i.e. live by the sword, die by the sword."




Why Define Terrorism?

The definition of terrorism this paper formulates is the committing of violence against civilians and civilian infrastructure as a proxy for resistance against political authority. This definition is based on an analysis of state terrorism as well as a thought experiment concerning the variables which determine whether an act can be considered terrorist. Whilst the question of what causes terrorism is the most examined question in what could broadly be called "terrorism studies", a common definition of terrorism, which one would expect before considering what causes terrorism, is much more elusive. The reason for this is that one side accuses the other of terrorism so that any means, including the means used by "the terrorists," can be used in hunting down the proclaimed enemy. This is a problem because if one definition of terrorism, e.g. targeting civilians, is taken for granted, then state and non-state political groups would be equally guilty of committing terrorist acts regardless of the noble end used to justify the odious, but necessary means. However, this essay will argue that the act of terrorism itself, i.e. violence against civilians and civilian infrastructure, has effects such that it does not matter whether one side takes control of the meaning of the event. In other words, the moral high ground may favour one side, but it does not control the reaction of the other side in their first-hand interpretation of events and subsequent reactions among actors capable of organising transnational violence in pursuit of a political voice.

The following essay criticises the lack of accountability of militarily dominant states when they are shown to have been wrong in their justification for the use of violence, i.e. war, for regime change or revenge and leading to a large proportion of civilian casualties. Russia, the US and Israel all currently occupy areas in and around the Middle East using superior conventional military to sustain regional hegemony in Chechnya, Iraq and Palestine respectively. Moreover, all of these countries have accepted a high civilian casualty rate in the occupied region due to the nature of the enemy to "blend in" with the population. The argument "they are no better" becomes the apologetic of the invading forces as everyone in the population represents a possible target, as represented by t-shirts worn by Israeli soldiers depicting pregnant women as two for one targets. [1]

The Chechens, Iraqis and Palestinians have all experienced independence movements led by what are locally perceived as revolutionaries. The terrorist distinction here is that these local revolutionaries, e.g. Hamas, do not have the conventional military capability to defend themselves against a state such as Israel which has the unconditional support of the US. Qassam rockets have been a continued nuisance to Israel, but have only resulted in a handful of casualties, whilst Israel's recent revenge attack, fought over a period of weeks, resulted in 280 deaths of children alone. Israel even attacked a UN school during the Gaza incursion, killing two boys. [2] The material result of Israel's one sided war in Gaza will, as suggested no doubt result in further justifying Hamas in their pursuit of the destruction of Israel; however, the moral justification that the elected leadership in Gaza are terrorists takes precedence over the material consequence of attacking a population seeking to elevate itself above the label of terrorism, at least in terms of the building of civilian infrastructure. The question remains: is the legitimate versus terrorist distinction decided solely on the variable of which side can decidedly obliterate the other with conventional, as opposed to unconventional, warfare?

The answer to the above question is that might is still right both in terms of military outcomes and the way in which a conflict is framed politically, i.e. "history is written by the victors":

The transnational elite seems not to be satisfied just with eliminating its opponents (Arafat yesterday, Milosevic today, Saddam tomorrow — the 'war criminals' and terrorists, as characterised by this elite whose kangaroo courts are, naturally, unable to perceive the massive war crimes and state terrorism of its own members!) The transnational elite is even more interested - as every totalitarian regime has been - in rewriting History, so that the submission of future generations can also be secured. [3]

Speaking from a purely consequentialist viewpoint, the political justification for war is not enough to prevent Middle Eastern terrorism from emerging from populations living in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya and Gaza which are seemingly at the whim and mercy of the occupying military. This is a consequentialist view insofar as the war in Iraq may have paradoxically caused religious terrorism to take greater hold in the country, with the democratically-elected regime being decided on the grounds of the religious majority; moreover, Al Qaeda are able to recruit new members from the pool of family and friends of unintended civilian casualties looking for revenge and/or having nothing else perceivably to live for after losing their home and family.

In short, whilst Saddam Hussein was a secularist in the running of Iraq before 2003, the war in Iraq and lack of recognition of Palestine has fulfilled the academic prophecy of the democratic election of a religious radical, Muqtada Al-Sadr, who is more likely to support religious terrorism over any transcendent secular rule of law. [4] In Iraq, the shift in power to the religious majority, i.e. Shia Islam, means that Iran has a moral and political foothold in Iraq, not unlike the Roman Catholic Church in Europe until Joseph Stalin famously remarked "How many divisions does the pope have?" The difference is that the religious support in Iran has divisions, whereas the Pope did not. The election of religious extremists happens because democracy has the potential to elect leaders who violently oppress and suppress the minority, as in the case of Germany and the rise to power of Hitler, who took advantage of the civic culture of Germany to gain prominence. [5]

This essay will continue with a description of state causes of terrorism. It is true that terrorists are irrational, seeking the means and ends of violence, unable to control their claimed populations and willing to murder for the sake of revenge; however, less examined are the consequences of states engaging in such acts. [6] As this subject has been explored in the literature, this section will consist of a summary of past arguments. Following this section, however, this essay will conduct a thought experiment concerning the (im)practicality of defining terrorism as simply a violent attack on civilians and civilian infrastructure.

State Causes of Terrorism

State causes of terrorism does not simply refer to the international relations of states which impact local populations such that individuals decide to take up the activity of guerrilla warfare. State causes of terrorism also refers to what drives states to commit terrorist acts. The answer is that terrorism causes more terrorism; if the people behind 9/11, for example, did not expect global consequences which could destroy the social fabric underneath their political cause, then they were not taking the military capabilities of the US seriously. Unconventional war, i.e. terrorism, may cause inconvenience and fear, but a conventional army will always win out due to the ease with which national troops can create large civilian casualties under the cloak of fighting terrorism. In short, states cause terrorism by responding to terrorism with terrorism.

To continue, both state and non-state terrorism communicate with each other in the form of both sides taking the moral high ground, whilst making exception to morality in the short term in the pursuit of the long term instantiation of an ideal society. In short, both sides justify their use of immorality for the sake of upholding morality. Such is the communication of terrorism: a cycle of killing motivated out of revenge with parties on both sides of the table refusing to negotiate with the other due to a lack of recognition of authority. The question is, which side is going to address concerns of the other first? If terrorism is to be stopped as a global project then the dominant power must take the moral high ground and demonstrate a commitment to using peaceful means to settle conflicts and even suffer future attacks until terrorism loses its argument that it is the only means for political change. In short, states need to disappear as targets by no longer representing those things against which organised, non-state terrorism fight. Otherwise, states merely play their role in sustaining terrorism by committing terrorist violence against the society which feeds and nurtures the leaders of the rebel organisations.

From a consequentialist standpoint, when a conventional military attacks populations lacking conventional military, the word "terrorism" to describe any possible unconventional fight back provides a convenient moral escape for the invading army in their attack on civilians and civilian infrastructure. In short, if no identifiable military target exists, then the invading army must make targets out of the civic landscape.

The proclamation that one is justified in war does nothing to stop the other side from reacting in any way possible to sustain itself as a "sovereign" entity. Simply put, the war on terrorism has become an apologetic for "civilised states" to engage in acts of torture, mass killings, and the invasion of sovereign states resulting in high civilian casualties. Two examples of the abuse of the word terrorism to garner support for war are Iraq and Palestine. Both of these semi-sovereign states represent geographies alleged to contain "militant extremism" threatening the stability of the home state and the surrounding states. In the case of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US claimed that Saddam Hussain was in violation, albeit just over the line, of Resolution 1441, in the holding of biological and chemical weapons as well as the pursuit of nuclear weapons, despite the lack of evidence from weapons inspectors, who were gaining some access to sensitive facilities. Moreover, the UK claimed that Iraq could land a missile in Britain within 45 minutes. [7] Both of these allegations proved false.

The US and Israel fight wars on similar terms, albeit on different scales, within the Middle East. In both the 2003 Iraq war and 2008 Israeli incursion into Gaza, a large and sophisticated conventional military force was used to invade a country with negligible military capabilities. This type of warfare in popular vernacular terms is called "asymmetric warfare". In asymmetric warfare, the weaker power has no conventional advantage, but rather is left with two choices: surrender completely or resort to the engine of terrorism: guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is an approach justified by its practitioners by the desperation of its population which has no access to conventional means of political representation and national defence but which nevertheless is motivated to pursue its sovereignty by virtue of a credible terrorist "deterrence". Scholars have compared Hollywood film plots which glorify guerrilla warfare, e.g. the Rebel Force in Star Wars, to modern international political struggles, of which Palestine is emblematic. Thus, terrorist means have been justified in popular cinema if not in history.

The definition of terrorism instantiates forms of continuity between all actions deemed destabilizing for social and economic processes. In short, terrorism in and of itself has not always been characterised as morally suspect. [8]

In the case of Iraq, this essay argues that the definition of terrorism was Saddam Hussein's credible and conventional threat to the balance of power in the Middle East, as Saddam, however odious he was as a dictator and however many people he had wrongfully imprisoned and/or killed, had also been building infrastructure, e.g. the installation of fibre optic cables, in Iraq that would have elevated the country to a greater conventional power. In the case of Gaza, Hamas also established greater civilian infrastructure in addition to seeking greater conventional means to sustain a state administration and conventional military; however, the intentions of Hamas today are irrelevant because Israel refuses to recognise a terrorist regime. Hamas may not recognise Israel's right to exist, but the elected political party of Gaza, Hamas, is not recognised by Israel. Mutual recognition of actors stops terrorism because it ends the rationalisation of violence against a state that is otherwise refusing to recognise the territorial claims to independence of a population vesting its interest in what UK Labour MP Gerland Kaufman describes as "the only game in town." [9]

In sum, the use of terrorism to describe pre-war Iraq and Gaza is ironic considering that in both cases the government was seeking greater coherence as an international player and seeking active dialogue which the opposing side refused based on the principle of "no negotiation with terrorists." Perhaps these cases illustrate what Jurate Kavaliauskaite calls a "prescribed terrorist identity," i.e. terrorist by virtue of assumption without reference to material reality. [10] One significant difference between these cases, however, is the great natural resources of Iraq versus the relatively small resources of Gaza, though Israel is alleged to be "breaking international law by exploiting the occupied territory's resources for its own gain." [11] However, real estate and development space is a valuable commodity as illustrated by the expansion of Israeli settlement camps throughout Palestine.

Defining Terrorism: A Thought Experiment

This essay will continue with a thought experiment stripped of as much reference to case studies as possible. In short, the following section will present a thought experiment which seeks to detach individual case studies from biasing an analysis of variables which determine whether an act can be defined as terrorism. This thought experiment will consist of the following social science variables: (1) conformity; (2) non-conformity; (3) authority; (4) resistance and (5) means. It is these five basic principles which work together to provide the context to a particular act to determine whether it is terrorist. These variables will be considered alone and together with the objective of creating an unbiased model of terrorism. In other words, any objective definition of terrorism must not preclude certain entities by virtue of status; terrorism can only be defined by its actions, as will be explained below, so neither intention nor legitimacy can mitigate the act of terrorism itself. In other words, the definition of terrorism presented in the first sentence of this essay, violence committed against civilians and civilian infrastructure, could apply to states and non-states alike.

Conformity

Conformity is the rule of the majority no matter if applied to culture or politics. Conformity is thus a positive trait within a democratic and fascist system alike insofar as all systems of government thrive on productive, i.e. harmonious, citizen participation. In this way, conformity not only describes the condition of "following the rules," but also conformity assumes a larger mainstream expressed through a variety of communication mechanisms. Modern government is founded on the principle that ignorance is no excuse for breaking the law; however, mitigation can take into account one's culpability in carrying out an act. [12]

Conformity is important in human society, as mass following of trends and behaviour set predictable standards which go on to instil a feeling of security within the population. However, conformity is not always in the best interest of a population. For example, a capitalist banking structure based on conformity to high-risk investment strategies might have paid off in the short-term, but the long-term effects have exposed the latent contradictions inherent in a system predicated on self-regulation and non-transparency.

The relationship of conformity to terrorism is seemingly obvious. Terrorists attack conformity because in the disruption of the appearance of security people become frightened of living their usual lives. Terrorism is thus linked with conformity by virtue of a mainstream population that sees itself as sharing a trait with the institution under attack. To provide the other side of this equation, one can imagine a badly planned terrorist attack which fails to account for the interpretation of the act, and therefore results in only a criminal prosecution, as opposed to highlighting the significance of the attack by prosecuting the offender as a terrorist. Like hate crimes, terrorism is a special crime not because of the material act, per se, but rather the intention behind it.

Non-conformity

Non-conformity is the rejection of a popular social trend or law. Non-conformity is not always a conscious act; nevertheless, the identification of non-conformity consists of an identification of individuals and groups not participating in the norms and laws of the land. Non-conformity is the engine of social change and history is made up of outcomes resulting from all material influences, including the political movements of non-conformists.

Non-conformity is a risky venture for any individual or group as rebellion, however positive case studies prove, is viewed as a destabilising influence, fostering insecurity among agents. All individuals and groups will seek security; we are programmed by our DNA to crave food, water and sex. However, the form this security-seeking takes is dependent upon factors such as the pursuit of short-term versus long-term gains. Non-conformity represents a threat to the short-term gain of perceived security as represented by a "stable" society. However, if this stability means a straight line to long-term failure, then non-conformity can serve as an escape.

Non-conformity is the essence of terrorism, but it does not define terrorism. The 1930 Indian Salt March, let by Mahatma Ghandi, was a form of non-compliance with British rule, but the act itself was peaceful. The use of India's natural resources, i.e. salt, by its people was not a bomb. The act was, however, a non-conformist act of long-term survival. So, whilst non-conformity should not be seen as wholly defining terrorism, the seeking of long-term survival should constitute a part of the definition of terrorism as attacks are carried out against a commons whose crimes only consist of tacitly accepting the illegitimate power. Again, terrorism is not wholly the rejection of authority; not all rejections of authority are terrorist in nature, but a central tenet of all terrorism is the lack of recognition of authority over the domain which is the target of attack. A school shooting, for example, is terrorist in nature insofar as it targets civilians. In addition, in targeting civilians at an institution, i.e. a particular school, the killing becomes politically-charged as the violence is aimed against the institution as much as the individuals.

Authority

Authority is a political concept because it takes for granted the privilege of one person to decide another person's fate by virtue of reputation. Authority is an essential component of democracy which decides how a person gets elected, but does nothing to constrain US presidents, e.g. George W. Bush, and ex German dictators, e.g. Adolf Hitler, alike from abusing the mechanism of authority vested in a democratically-elected political leader. Indeed, in deciding to go to war, Tony Blair was hardly faced with a consensus as to the right thing to do, but went with what he described as his "conscience" which he later revealed were derived from praying with God. [13] The point here is not to criticise a political leader from basing decisions on conscience which might indeed be fed by faith; on the contrary, citizens depend upon a leader's conscience for their discretion in representing societal interests. However, the point is that once elected, all leaders can be despots or dictators even if exercising such authority through legitimate, i.e. democratic, means.

To bring the conversation back to the central point, whether democratic or not, authority is something vested after some seizure of power, whether legitimate or illegitimate. As such, terrorism represents a challenge to authority insofar as it does not recognise the legitimacy of elected world leaders. Thus, the assumption of the illegitimacy of dominant authority is an important component of terrorism, but does not wholly define terrorism. To put things in perspective, children are often described as "little terrors" when they rebel and cause chaos at school or in the household. Little brothers and sisters "terrorise" each other. The mere defiance of authority merely reflects a desire for independence. Whether this independence is acceptable to the dominant power determines whether future relations will be terrorist or diplomatic in nature.

Resistance

Resistance is an important component of being human. Children learn to resist the authority of their parents through various means and this is considered a healthy part of human development. Resistance is a sign of coherence, as one must be self-aware, recognising an "other" against which to campaign, i.e. to actively and consciously resist. Resistance is an instinct of infants, a learnt behaviour for teenagers (i.e. the alternative culture which is really one of many branches of the mainstream), and a tool for political change among politicians. Historical institutionalism shows that resistance holds the fragile pieces of civilisation together; no one wants a revolution at their door every five years.

Whether revolutionary or evolutionary, the common thread of resistance is active, self-conscious, non-compliance. Resistance can be peaceful or violent. In the case of terrorism, resistance is violent and does not target the force representing the most immediate threat. For example, a population host to an invading army may seek to attack the civilians of the invading army when the host population does not have access to conventional means of national defence. In this case, resistance becomes terrorist in nature when violence is used against civilian parties whose link to the most immediate threat is one of supplying tax money and political legitimacy to the government responsible for authorising its military to carry out the invasion.

The meta-principle of terrorism has been more about violent and amoral resistance than any kind of civil disobedience. The problem is that when terrorist groups affiliated with "Islamic extremism", for example, inflict their injuries upon civilians to make their case, Muslims everywhere are punished, as any act of civil disobedience by a Muslim is seen as a prelude to terrorism. Concepts such as "inciting terrorism" are subjective and can be used to describe the production of any material which might motivate someone to take action.

Thus, any definition of terrorism would have to take into account that the material act of terrorism represents a resistance. Whether or not attacks on civilians can be an effective mode of political change (the US dropped two atomic bombs on civilian populations) is a question of the effects of terrorism, which can work to benefit (as in the case of the US) or hurt (as in the case of the Taliban) the party using terrorist means to resist. What this essay proposes is that a single definition of terrorism would be appropriate to describe both of these cases aside from the assumption that 9/11 was committed by non-state actors (this assumption runs contrary to some opinion in the US which believes its own government planned and executed 9/11).

Means

Everything above leads to a conversation of means as the deciding factor for determining whether an act of non-compliance or resistance can be called terrorism. In short, if the means of an act is violent and targeting civilians, then it is terrorist. There is a slight problem here, however, insofar as there is a question of what constitutes the targeting of civilians. Can civilians be targets if they are used as "human shields"?

The answer is that such definitions are arbitrary insofar as there is no absolute truth corresponding to the answer and thus the definition is left to the party which targets, but does not target, civilians. In other words, just as it seems that terrorism can be decidedly defined by means, the material reality of killing large proportions of civilians, as in the case of the US atomic bombs and in the case of the 2008-2009 Israeli incursion into Gaza, comes into play. In both cases, terrorism (or rather lack thereof) was defined by the just cause behind the action. And so, terrorism is not solely decided by the targeting of civilians, but rather the justness of the cause.

This brings the discussion back to the question of who decides the justness of the cause. The answer, again, is might makes right, time and time again in defining not only the material outcome, as in the case of the capability of Al Qaeda to attack New York, but also in the formation of what constitutes terrorism, which in the end is the word used to describe the people who are engaging in the same acts as the state, but are deemed to be doing so without legitimacy. This is the same cycle of war which characterised relations between European states throughout the 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. The difference now is that rather than fighting a conventional battle, small groups are using technology and guerrilla tactics to strike blows against the mainstream.

All war brings high civilian casualties and in this way all war is terrorist in nature. However, war is also a means to an end. War is a last resort, or first resort, as the case may be, but as a last resort war is not an end in itself. War cannot be an end in itself, as war is costly and without a chest of war treasure to take home, war drains the resources of a population to the extent of economic crises. The ten trillion US dollars used to fund the Iraq war since 2003 dwarfs the one trillion US dollars recently used to bail out the US economy. Indeed, the expenditure on the Iraq war is the elephant in the room regarding the current state of the global economy. [14]

Summary

The above thought experiment refrained from using case study references for the purposes of formulating an argument without the bias inherent in prior opinions formed in relation to current global conflicts. However, the above sought to understand what defines terrorism, as opposed to legitimate right to self defence, favouring the material outcome of the killing of civilians and destruction of civilian infrastructure as a proxy for a problem with the political leaders of the people under attack. Conformity, non-conformity, authority, resistance and means are all variables which determine the structural conditions under which terrorism functions and justifies itself. However, neither of these variables alone inclusively determines whether an act is terrorism. The importance of this discovery is that prevention of terrorism can take the form of a reduction in violence in the pursuit of all of these political outcomes. In short, neither hegemonic conformity (the West) nor resistance movements (Hamas) should target civilians; however, each should expect the material consequences of using terrorist means, i.e. live by the sword, die by the sword.

Conclusion

However terrorism is defined, its condemnation must not take the form of targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure alleged to be "behind" terrorism; if this means that a group of terrorists taking refuge at a primary school cannot be taken into custody, then so be it; however, an all out bombing of the school is a terrorist act against the population even if militants are taking refuge. The idea that terrorists should not be able to get away with using human shields and therefore human shields should be ignored, i.e. obliterated, should be abolished. It has become normal for families in Italy, for example, to negotiate for the release of their relatives kidnapped in Iraq. Moreover, the destruction of civilian infrastructure to harm terrorists should end, as should all collective punishment, due to the long-term outcome of a population that sees only its infrastructure destroyed and is thus likely to support guerrilla movements that promise a possible end to the domination of one society over another.

In closing, it is important to formulate a universal definition of terrorism and then condemn any political entity engaging in the act. In the West, terrorism is an over-used, yet under-defined, term that creates fear among a Christian population which feels more under threat from a "dirty bomb" than credible local threats, such as the probability of muggings or other violent crime which has far less media attention. Moreover, the association of terrorism with Islam leads to a paranoid fear of Muslim immigrants who only want more opportunities to become part of a society. A universal definition of terrorism is not so much the problem, but rather the lack of application of the concept to the actions of all actors that cause unjustified, and unnecessary, deaths on foreign soil. In short, if Saddam can be tried and executed for causing unnecessary deaths based on false pretences, then it is not such a preposterous idea to indict George W. Bush and Tony Blair for going to war based on false pretences, as well as hold Israel to account in the UN for its direct targeting of civilians.







Dr. Dennis Lee Chapman has recently completed and passed his Ph.D. thesis (Hull University) which compares regions of the E.U. based on 'domestic sources of international outcomes'. With scholarly interests in international private security, policing, education and the politics of science, Dr. Chapman is currently using a research grant toward field work in England. This field work seeks to further demonstrate the political similarities of volunteer organisations qualified by high stakes up to and including death, e.g. skydiving, martial arts, mushroom hunting (Fine et al. 1996), etc., and public citizenship. Dr. Chapman can be contacted at: dionysus@myicrosoft.com.







Endnotes

1. Dominic Waghorn, 'Israeli Army T-Shirts Mock Gaza Killings', Sky News, 20 March, 2009.
http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/World-News/Israeli-Army-T-Shirts-Mock-Killing-Palestinian-Women
-And-Children-During-Gaza-Offensive Article/200903315245946 2. 'Israeli Cabinet Appears Ready to Declare a Gaza Cease-Fire', The New York Times, 16 January, 2009.

3. Takis Fotopoulos, 'Milosevic and the distortion of the history of Yugoslavia's dismemembering', The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy, 2, 4 (2006), 1.

4. Giles Moss and Ben O'Loughlin, 'Convincing Claims? Democracy and Representation in Post-9/11 Britain', Political Studies, 56 (2008), 705-724; C. Barnett, 'Deconstructing Radical Democracy: Articulation, Representation and Being-With-Others', Political Geography, 23, 5 (2004), 503-528.

5. Sheri Berman, 'Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic', World Politics, 49, 3 (1997), 401-429.

6. Oded Lowenheim and Gadi Heimann, 'Revenge in International Politics', Security Studies, 17 (2008), 685-724.

7. Norman Baker, 'Campbell, that dodgy dossier and the lies that cost David Kelly his life', Global Research, 06 October, 2007.

8. Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster, 'Insuring Terrorism, Assuring Subjects, Ensuring Normality: The Politics of Risk After 9/11', Alternatives, 33 (2008), 207.

9. Sir Gerald Kaufman, 'Israel acting like Nazis in Gaza', 16 January, 2009.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qMGuYjt6CP8

10. Jurate Kavaliauskaite, 'Chimeras of Terror: Disciplining Roma Identity in Lithuania', Alternatives, 33 (2008), 154.

11. 'Israeli West Bank Mines Illegal', BBC News, 09 March, 2009.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world middle_east/7933155.stm

12. For a summary study of mitigating circumstances in capital cases, see Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, 'A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors and the Progression toward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice', Oregon Law Review, 83 (2004).

13. 'Blair "Prayed to God" over Iraq', BBC News, 03 March, 2006.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4772142.stm

14. Linda J. Bilmes and Joseph E Stiglitz, 'The $10 Trillion Hangover: Paying the Price for Eight Years of Bush', Harper's (January 2009), 31-6.